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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court correctly 
determined that where the use of the privately owned streambed of the 
Weber River is more than incidental to the right of floating thereon, such 
use would constitute a trespass. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for "correctness." Laney v. Fairview City, 
2002 UT 79, 1 9, 57 P.3d 1007, 1011. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Utah. Jodi 
Conatser, Kevin Conatser, Lacey Conatser and Nicole Mann (collectively 
the "Conatsers") sought a declaration from the trial court that the public 
has an easement to use the privately owned streambed and banks of the 
Weber River (the "River"), and not just a right of floatation upon the 
public waters constituting the River. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court correctly concluded that the right of floating on 
1 
natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such a right does not allow 
members of the public to walk on the privately owned riverbed or 
riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is incidental to the 
right of floating. 
In J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 
1138, n.6 (Utah 1982), this Court adopted the majority view that because 
the public owns the water in natural streams, there is a corresponding 
right to float upon such waters. In doing so, the Court embraced the 
rationale and policy expressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v. 
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961), which held that the right of 
floating does not include a broader easement to walk on privately owned, 
subaqueous land for fishing, hunting or other purposes. Because that 
issue was not before the Court J.J.N.P., however, it declined to reach the 
question. This case squarely presents the issue the Court appropriately 
declined to decide in J.J.N.P. and, despite the trial court's attempt to 
limit the applicability of its holding to the named parties, has potentially 
far-reaching implications for private property owners throughout the 
state of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 4, 2000, the Conatsers put a small rubber raft in 
the Weber River at a public access point and proceeded to float down the 
River to another public access point. [R. 00314.] Between the public 
access points, the River crosses over a number of parcels of private real 
property. [Id.] 
While floating the River, the Conatsers touched the privately owned 
streambed in the following ways: (i) the raft in which they were riding 
touched or skidded along the bottom of the River in shallow areas, (ii) the 
paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion, (iii) Kevin Conatser's 
fishing tackle came in contact with the bottom, and (iv) Kevin Conatser 
intentionally got out of the raft and walked along the streambed to 
facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been strung over 
the River. [R. 00314.] 
On two occasions prior to June 4, 2000, Kevin Conatser was 
informed by one or more of the Defendants that he was trespassing on 
private property. [Id.) On June 4, 2000, the Conatsers were again 
informed by two of the Defendants that they were trespassing and were 
asked to pick up their raft and walk out via a parallel railroad easement. 
[Id.] The Conatsers refused to walk out as requested and instead 
continued downstream to a public access point where a Deputy Sheriff 
from Morgan County was waiting. [R. 00315.] The Sheriff cited Kevin 
and Jodi Conatser for criminal trespass for which they were later found 
guilty by the Morgan County Justice Court. [Id.] On appeal of the 
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I nrrimnl «i 11 mi vic I ion 111 trespass charges v\ue ihsniissed b\ the Stale in 
light nf (he perrr-Mvrd Irenl uncerlninty regaidnii' Hie fNmalsrrs' slain is I-IS 
trespassers. [Id.] While the criminal case was pending, the Conatsers 
filed a civil action in the Second District Court seeking a judicial 
• r * :, -iination thai Lhey, as members oi the general public, not only have 
a r i gh t to final i l imn tllin1 Wwt i hi l l alba I II Ipill it In i,"aililL mm illllii privately 
owned bed of the River [R. 0001-0005.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
. . . UJ:. upreme Oour. decisions estd^ixsn two concepts Uiat 
art" ;. - \ ' 
navigable, although admittedly irrelevant for determining whether the 
p ublie has a right to be upon the water, is an indispensable finding in 
determining the extent ol Hie public's interest ui the water's underlying 
briill When a bach,, ll viriliri is mini intvi^abli III " land m i i i i jni tyin^ ill i , mil 
private
 o w n ersh ip . Here, the Conatsers have conceded 'that the River is 
non-navigable and that its bed therefore is in p.-"vale ownership. Second, 
because the be I in .(uestiuii is in pi ivate ownerslay . ,;- owners thereof 
retain the import. : * - -
manner urged by the Conatsers. 
The trial court thus correctly concluded tha t the right of floating on 
natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such righ t does not allow 
members of the public to walk on the privately owned riverbed or 
riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is incidental to the 
right of floating. The trial court's ruling is in harmony with prior Utah 
Supreme decisions, the influential and oft-cited Wyoming case of Day v. 
Armstrong which carefully balanced the correlative rights of landowners 
and recreationists to privately owned subaqueous land, and Utah 
statutes relating to the issue. The trial court should, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. BECAUSE IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE RIVER IS NON-
NAVIGABLE, THE CONATSERS CANNOT ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO 
BE UPON THE PRIVATELY OWNED RIVERBED. 
The Conatsers have conceded that the River is non-navigable and 
that, as a result, its bed is in private ownership. Because the bed in 
question is in private ownership, the owners thereof have the 
constitutionally protected right to prohibit others from making use of it. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the right of the 
public to float on natural waters is recognized in Utah, but that such a 
right does not allow members of the public to walk on the privately 
owned riverbed or riverbanks, except to the extent that such contact is 
incidental to the right of floating. 
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1 Prior Utah Supreme Court decisions support the trial court's 
ruling that the public's right to make use of the River' s bed 
is limited to contact that is incidental to the right to float 
upon the water. 
This Court has previously recognized the importance of the 
respective rights held by both tl: ic public and the private property owners 
- , . • " ' i ' , i : 
As a corollary of the proposition that the public owns the 
water is the rule that there is a public easement over the 
water regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the 
water., Therefore, public waters do no 1: trespass in areas 
where they are naturally appear', and the public does not 
trespass when upon such waters. 
I'll all: II ] 36- 37 i|iifi!ig wi th rippmv.'il Iknf , r?i\ln ? /, i, \ yu I h', V (Ill 11 17 
11951) and Southern Idaho Fish and Game Assoc, v. Picabo Livestock, Inc , 
•528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974)) (emphasis supplied). By providing for a 
limited easement over and upon the water and by Jurtlier bunting that 
(Msemrnl In nn hull1 III.! \ II 11 II i i r hv i h r " III.ill i.iiiii hi nndr.rt.akui unly after 
lawful access to the water is achieved, the Court unambiguously 
recognized the necessity of preserving the very property rights the 
L.onatsers now seek to extinguish. Although tl le J .v ) .IV J ' decision 
expressly and . ippnipnatnly iH'usr i l (n nMrlli ,i i l r tc i i i i i i i iahni i nil Hi isruii; 
here, its careful use of words comports with an earlier Utah case decided 
more than a half-century ago involving a landowner's right to exclude 
others from land underlying another non-navigable body of water, Scipio 
Lake. 
As noted by the Court in Monroe v State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946), 
the parties' respective rights hinged entirely on whether Scipio Lake was 
navigable. On the one hand, if the lake was navigable, the subaqueous 
land belonged to the State, and the defendant, who was seeking to use 
the land underlying the lake for grazing under a lease from the State, 
would be entitled to make use of the land. Id. at 760. If, on the other 
hand, the lake was non-navigable, the plaintiff, as a private landowner, 
would be allowed to exclude the defendant from making use of the 
lakebed. Id. After analyzing the facts before it, the Court determined 
that the lake was indeed non-navigable and title to the lakebed, 
therefore, was held by the plaintiff. Id. at 762. Because the plaintiff 
owned the bed of the lake, he had the right to exclude others, including 
the defendant, from making use of it. Id. 
From Monroe, two concepts that are determinative of this matter 
are derived. First, whether a body of water is non-navigable, although 
irrelevant for determining whether the public has a right to be upon or 
over the water,1 is an indispensable factor in determining the extent of 
1
 SeeJ.J.N.R, 655 P.2d 1137 ("Irrespective of the ownership of the 
bed and navigability of the water, the public, if it can obtain lawful 
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the public's interest in the underlying bed. Quite simply, if the body of 
water in question is non-navigable, the land underlying it is in private 
ownership. The Conatsers have conceded that the River is non-
navigable. [R.00536, Hearing Transcript, at pgs. 10, 39-40.] Necessarily, 
then, the portions of streambed at issue aire in private ownership. 
Second, private ownership of subaqueous beds of non-navigable bodies 
of water includes with it the important right to exclude others from those 
beds - a right that has been repeatedly found to be "one of the most 
essential sticks in bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
Consequently, the Conatsers cannot establish a right to be upon the bed 
of the River. 
2. The Day v. Armstrong decision, which has been embraced by 
this Court, provides a well-reasoned and balanced approach 
to the issues at hand. 
In J. J.N.P., this Court based its decision that the public has the 
right to float on the naturally flowing waters on the well-reasoned 
decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 
137 (Wyo. 1961). SeeJ.J.N.P. 655 P.2d 1136-37. The Day decision 
carefully balanced the competing interests of the public to be upon 
access to the body of water, has the right to . . . participate in any lawful 
activity when utilizing that water.") 
publicly owned water and the right of the private landowner to exclude 
others from the privately owned land underlying such waters. 
Much like the instant case, the conflict in Day arose after a private 
rancher on the North Platte River attempted to prevent the passage of 
recreational floaters, including one Day, a recreationist. Id. at 141. The 
central dispute in Day centered on the rights of the public to make use of 
an non-navigable stream and, importantly, its privately owned bed. Id. 
at 139. 
As with Utah, Wyoming law provides that all water is owned by the 
state and that land underlying navigable waters is also owned by the 
state, whereas land underlying non-navigable waters can be and often is 
privately owned. Id. at 146; cf. Nephilrr. Co. v. Bailey, 181 P.2d 215, 216 
(Utah 1947); Monroe, 175 P.2d at 760. To reach the issue of the public's 
right to make use of the river's bed, the Day court had to first determine 
whether the bed's title was in private or public ownership. A navigability 
determination was thus necessary. See Day, 632 P.2d at 144 (noting 
that though the "test of navigability does not determine other uses to 
which the State may put its waters . . . [it] would determine title to the 
land underlying them.") On this point, the Wyoming court stated: 
Streams in their natural state, such as that described by the 
factual matter appearing in the record before us , although 
capable of intermittent floating of craft for recreational use 
and for small commercial use in the floating of ties, logs, and 
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timber, are nevertheless unsuited for navigation in interstate 
or international commerce and are not of such economic 
value for transportation as justifies their being classified as 
navigable waters, thereby taking from riparian proprietors the 
title and ownership of the bed and channel of the river where 
it flows by, through, over, across, or upon their lands. So we 
must hold the portion of the river here in question is 
nonnavigable and that its bed and channel are the property of 
the riparian owner. 
Id. at 147. 
Although it concluded that the river was non-navigable and the 
beds therefore in private ownership, the Day court held that 
"irrespective" of navigability, the public was entitled to make use of the 
water for floating provided the water was actually capable of supporting 
such use. Id. at 146 ("When waters are able to float craft, they may be so 
used.*); accord J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137. It cautioned, however, that 
"in using the State's waters for floating, the public is not privileged, 
except as incidental to such use, to violate the rights of riparian owners." 
Id. at 146. Moreover, 
where the use of the bed or channel is more than incidental 
to the right of floating use of the waters, and the primary use 
of the bed or channel rather than floating use of the waters, 
such wading or walking is a trespass upon the lands 
belonging to the riparian owners and is unlawful. Such 
trespass cannot be made lawful either by legislative or judicial 
action. 
Id. 
While it is true that the State's power to regulate the use of water 
does not depend on a designation of navigable or non-navigable, it does 
not follow that the State can grant unlicensed use of the private land 
underlying or surrounding the non-navigable water, which, unlike the 
water, it neither owns nor holds in trust for the public.2 Under such 
circumstances, the public should only be allowed use of the water for 
activities that are lawful, including the floating of craft when the water in 
question is so capable of being used. See Day, 362 P.2d at 147. But this 
does not, despite the Conatsers' urging, bestow upon the public the 
privilege of violating the rights of private land owners by authorizing 
activities such as walking and wading that are appropriately considered 
unlawful. Id. at 146. Such a contention was rejected in Day as an 
unjustified intrusion on private property rights, and should also be 
rejected here. 
2
 Extending the public's easement over the water to also include the 
right to make unfettered use of the privately owned subaqueous property 
results in a taking. 'To say that an appropriation of a public easement 
across a landowner's premises does not constitute a taking of property 
but rather a mere restriction on use, is to use the words in a manner 
that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning." Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987) (holding that if California 
wanted a public easement across private property, it could use its power 
of eminent domain, but it would constitute a taking that must be paid 
for) (internal citation omitted); see also Kaiser Aetna, AAA U.S. at 179-80 
(concluding that if the government wanted to open a privately owned 
marina to the public it could do so, but the "right to exclude," so 
universally held to be a fundamental property right, is a type of interest 
that the Government cannot take without paying just compensation). 
11 
3. At a fundamental level, the question of navigability is 
inescapable. 
Regardless of navigability, all waters in Utah, unless they have 
been lawfully appropriated, are held in trust by the state for the benefit 
of its citizens. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (2006); see also Adams v. 
Portage Irr. Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-54 (Utah 1937). 
However, only if a body of water is navigable will its bed also be held in 
trust by the state and considered "public lands of the state." See State v. 
Rolio, 262 P. 987, 993-94 (Utah 1927) ("It is settled law in this countiy 
that lands underlying navigable waters within a state belong to the state 
in its sovereign capacity."') (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S. 49, 54 (1926)). Because private entities are generally without 
authority to exclude others from public lands, see, e.g., United States v. 
Buford, 30 P. 433, 434 (Utah 1892) (finding that the private entity had 
"no right to exclude the public from the public lands at all, in any way 
whatever"), there can be little question that members of the public have a 
right to make use of the publicly owned land underlying navigable bodies 
of water. 
By comparison, when, as in this case, a body of water is non-
navigable, a private landowner may hold title to the underlying bed and 
is to be accorded rights consistent with the traditional notions of private 
property ownership, including the hallmark of all such private property 
rights - the right to exclude others. See B.AM. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
County, 2004 UT App 34, Tf 57, 87 P.3d 710, 729 (noting that the right to 
exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
commonly characterized as property) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830); see 
also Monroe, 175 P.2d 759. 
The fact that the bed of a non-navigable body of water belongs to 
the riparian owner in no way alters the statutory edict that the water 
belongs to the public, nor does it "defeat the State's power to regulate the 
use of the water or defeat the right the public has to be on the water." 
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137. However, neither the State's power to 
regulate nor the public's right to be upon the water defeats the rights, 
including the right to exclude others, that appropriately belong to the 
owners of the land underlying those waters. Accordingly, if private 
property rights are to be respected and preserved, a navigability 
determination cannot merely be overlooked, but is instead inescapable. 
B. UTAH STATUTORILY RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANT 
PROERTY RIGHTS BELONGING TO OWNERS OF STREAMBEDS. 
Utah statutorily protects the important property rights belonging to 
owners of streambeds. Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, which deals with 
entry on private land by hunters and fishermen, requires that for private 
property to be properly posted "'No Trespassing' signs or a minimum of 
100 square inches of bright yellow, bright orange or fluorescent paint are 
13 
displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, 
gates and rights-of-way entering the l and / Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-
14(1 )(d) (2005) (emphasis supplied). A person engaged in taking wildlife 
or wildlife related activities may not "without the permission of the owner 
or person in charge, enter upon privately owned land that is cultivated or 
properly posted." Id. at § 23-20-14(2)(a). A violation of subsection 2(a) is 
considered a class B misdemeanor. Id. at § 23-20-14(6). 
By allowing "fishing streams" to be properly posted, the legislature 
has expressly recognized the private landowner's right to exclude others 
from privately owned streambeds in this state. If, as the Conatsers 
assert, a public easement exists to wade and walk in all streams in the 
state, the legislature's inclusion of "fishing streams" in the statute would 
be rendered meaningless. See Trail Mtn. Coal Company v. The Utah Div. 
of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Utah 1996) (refusing 
to construe a statute so as to render terms meaningless). 
The rule that is most consonant with the decisions of this Court in 
J.J.N.P., Monroe and the Utah statutes pertaining to the issue is that set 
forth in Day v. Armstrong and adopted by the trial court. In other words, 
where use of a privately owned streambed is more than incidental to the 
right of floating thereon, such use constitutes a trespass. [R. 00319.] In 
addition to providing a practical, workable solution to the issue at hand, 
such a rule promotes harmony between the constitutionally protected 
private property rights belonging to the Defendants and all other 
landowners in the state of Utah with the interests of the public to be 
upon the waters of this State. 
C. WYOMING'S RULE, WHICH REPRESENTS THE BETTER-
REASONED APPROACH WHEN COMPARED TO THE 
APPROACHES TAKEN BY OTHER WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING 
COLORADO AND WYOMING, SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN UTAH. 
Western States have taken a variety of approaches in resolving 
conflicts over water use between the public and private landowners. At 
the extremes are Montana and Colorado, reflecting the most "liberal* and 
"restrictive" positions, respectively. Compare Stephen D. Osborne, et a/., 
Laws Governing Recreational Access to Waters of the Columbia Basin: A 
Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVT'L. L. 399, 445 (2003) (asserting that 
Montana's access laws are the most liberal among the Northwestern 
states of Idaho, Washington, and Oregon), and Lori Potter et al., Legal 
Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property in Colorado: A 
Reply to John Hill, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 457, 498 (2002) (suggesting 
that Colorado's access laws are the most restrictive among the states of 
Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Montana, Idaho, and California). A review 
of the seminal cases from Montana and Colorado relating to the issue at 
bar further supports the conclusion that the "middle of the road" rule 
adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day v. Armstrong is the 
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better-reasoned and more appropriate approach to resolving the instant 
dispute. 
1. Colorado's approach is currently unworkable in Utah. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 
(Colo. 1979), narrowly defined the public's right to use streams flowing 
through private land without the owner's consent. Emmert and the other 
defendants had floated and fished from rafts over private property on the 
Colorado River and had touched the riverbed as they crossed the 
property. Id. at 1026. At the landowner's request, the sheriff arrested 
Emmert and the other defendants. The defendants were convicted of 
violating a trespass statute that provided: "[a] person commits the crime 
of third degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or 
upon premises." See id. at 1026. Emmert appealed his conviction to the 
Colorado Supreme Court. 
On appeal, the court noted the general rule of property law in 
Colorado states "that the land underlying non-navigable streams is the 
subject of private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the 
adjoining lands." Id. at 1027 (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 
(Colo. 1977); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905); Hanlon v. 
Hobson, 51 P. 433, 435 (Colo. 1897)). The parties had stipulated that the 
Colorado River was non-navigable, and no challenge was made to the 
adjacent landowner's ownership of the riverbed. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 
1026-27. 
Applying the common law rule "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad 
coelum" which means that "he who owns the surface of the ground has 
the exclusive right to everything which is above it," the court held that 
"the ownership of the bed of a non-navigable stream vests in the owner 
the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed, subject 
only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions and 
regulations." Id. at 1027. Accordingly, one who intruded upon that 
space without the permission of the owner, regardless of the recreational 
purpose, committed a trespass. Id. 
Emmert raised the defense that Article XVI, section 5 of the 
Colorado Constitution3 established a public right to recreational use of 
all waters in the state. Id. at 1027-28. Relying on an earlier case, 
Hartman v. Tresise, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed, 
concluding that the constitutional provision applied to appropriation of 
water for beneficial use. Id. at 1028. In other words, Article XVI, section 
3
 This section provides: "the water of every natural stream, not 
heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared 
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of 
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." 
Colo. Const, art. XVI, § 5. 
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5 applied only to the right to make appropriations and not to the use of 
the state's water for recreation or fishing. 
In 1977, after the defendants' convictions in Emmert and while 
their appeal was pending, the Colorado General Assembly passed Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-4-504.5, id. at 1029, which defined "premises* for 
purposes of criminal trespass as "real property, buildings, and other 
improvements thereon, and the stream banks and beds of any non-
navigable fresh water streams flowing through such real property." Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-4-504.5 (Lexis 2006). Section 18-4-504.5 thus imposes 
criminal trespass liability on anyone who touches the stream banks or 
beds of rivers running through private property. Id. at § 18-4-504.5 
Although spawning a fair amount of criticism, throughout the past 
two decades the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
the continued validity of Emmert. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
County of Park v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 710 
(Colo. 2002) (citing Emmert); Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Empire Club, 804 P.2d 175, 
185 (Colo. 1991) (citing Emmert). That Colorado's approach to the issue 
is not currently in accord with Utah law is borne out by the J. J.N.P. 
decision, but it nevertheless remains the law in Colorado. 
2. Montana's attempt to deal with the public's rights to stream 
beds has resulted in considerable uncertainty. 
In contrast to Colorado, the Montana cases cited by the Appellants 
demonstrate, to a degree, a slightly more liberal resolution of the conflict, 
although the current state of the public's right to make use of privately 
owned subaqueous land in Montana is less-than clear. 
The first of the four cases cited by the Conatsers, Montana Coalition 
for Stream Access v. Outran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) {"Curran"), dealt 
with whether the public had the right to use the streambed of the 
Dearborn River, a river the court found to be navigable. Id. at 166. As a 
result of being designated navigable, ownership of both the water its bed 
was held by the State of Montana and not by the individual landowners 
who were attempting to restrict the public's use of the rivers. Id. In light 
of the fact that the navigability determination should have been 
dispositive of the case, the Montana Supreme Court's sweeping and 
unnecessary declaration that "under the Public Trust Doctrine and the 
1972 Montana Constitution, any waters that are capable of recreational 
use may so be used by the public without regard to streambed ownership 
or navigability for non-recreational purposes," id. at 171, is seemingly 
perplexing. See Gait v. State, 731 P.2d 912, 922 (1987) (describing the 
perplexing nature of the majority decision in Curran) (Sheehy J., 
dissenting). 
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If the facts presented in Curran were at issue here, there would be 
no question under Utah law as to the proper outcome. Like Montana, in 
Utah both the navigable body of water and land underlying it are owned 
by the State. A private party, therefore, could not lawfully prohibit the 
public's use of either the water or the bed. 
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 
(Mont. 1984) ^HildretYf), decided a little more than a month after Curran 
by a divided Montana Supreme Court, involved a similar conflict to 
Curran, this time on the Beaverhead River. Id. at 1091. Relying heavily 
on the questionable reasoning and language of the Curran decsion, the 
court in Hildreth went out of its way to avoid the navigability issue 
altogether, ruling instead that it was immaterial. See id. at 1092 The 
Hildreth court concluded that regardless of navigability the public had a 
"right to access for fishing and navigational purposes to the point of the 
high water mark" and a "right to portage in the least intrusive manner 
possible, avoiding damage to the adjacent owner's property and his 
rights." Id. at 1091. 
On the heels of the Curran and Hildreth decisions, Montana's 
legislative leaders met to develop what became known as Montana's 
Stream Access Law ("SAL"), codified at Montana Code Annotated §§ 23-2-
301, et seq.y in an attempt to define terms left unclear by Curran and 
Hildreth and to allay the fears of landowners over the scope of those 
rulings. See Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky: 
Balancing Agricultural and Recreational Claims to Scarce Water Resources 
in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN. ENVL L. J . 259, 273 (1992). 
The final SAL legislation was signed into law in 1985. Due to the great 
pains taken by the legislature to comply with earlier court decisions, the 
bill was expected to survive inevitable court challenges. Id. To the 
surprise of many, however, the Montana Supreme Court narrowed the 
holdings of Curran and Hildreth in case brought to challenge the SAL 
shortly after its enactment. Id. 
Gait v. Montana involved a constitutional challenge to the SAL and 
its provisions regarding the types of permissible uses on streambeds and 
banks. See 731 P. 2d 912. Although a divided Montana Supreme Court 
found several of the provisions of the SAL to be unconstitutional, 
including provisions of the statute that conferred public rights to 
overnight camping, construction of duck blinds, big game hunting, and 
requirements of private owners to compensate for the cost of portage 
routes, it concluded ultimately that the balance of the statutory scheme 
accorded with the Montana Constitution. Id. at 916. Even then, the Gait 
court reduced the public's ownership and use of surface water to an 
easement and although it conceded that the "public has a right of use up 
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to the high water mark* it restricted that right to "only such use as is 
necessary to utilization of the water itself." Id. at 915. It further evinced 
concern for private landowners when it "reaffirmed] well-established 
constitutional principles protecting property interests from confiscation," 
by ruling that the public's rights to the waterways "must be narrowly 
confined so that impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals 
is minimal." Id. at 916. As noted in a concurring opinion by Justice 
Gulbranson, 
[W]here the State has title to the streambed, it may legislate, 
within the limits of declared public policy, the use of the 
streambed. Where title to the streambed is privately owned, 
the State has no legal authority to legislate use of the bed and 
banks of that stream without paying just compensation 
through lawful eminent domain proceedings. 
Id. a t 917. In light of the Gait decision, to say that Montana law allows 
for the type of unlicensed use of privately owned streambeds sought 
herein by the Conatsers is simply inscrutable. 
While not explicitly reversing Curran and Hildrethy the Gait decision 
can be seen as a significant departure from those decisions by clearly 
favoring property owners with a decision that substantially protected 
private interests.4 In light of the about-face of the Montana Supreme 
4
 Notably, the majorities in both Curran and Gait relied on the Day 
v. Armstrong decision for support. Gait's limitation on incidental use to 
"such use as is necessary to a utilization of the water itself," 731 P.2d at 
915, is similar in effect to the language in Day declaring, "when so 
Court in Gait, "one can only conclude that the law respecting the 
correlative rights of landowners and the recreational water users in 
Montana is adrift in a sea of confusion." Gait, 731 P.2d at 920 (Sheehy 
J., dissenting). 
The most recent case involving Montana's SAL, Madison v. Graham, 
126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), involved a constitutional 
challenge to Montana's SAL on both due process and void for vagueness 
grounds. Id. at 1324. The district court dismissed both claims, holding 
that due process claim was barred by res judicata and that the void for 
vagueness claim was without merit. Id. at 1327-28. The district court 
also dismissed what it construed as a takings claim,5 but not before 
floating craft, as a necessary incident to that use, the bed or channel of 
the waters may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the grounding of 
craft." Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46. In addition, like Day, the Gait court 
recognized that the State was unable to legislate use of the privately 
owned property, unless, of course, compensation was made to the 
landowners for such use. 
5
 Madison subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of 
the complaint. See Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 
2002). The appellants had alleged in their complaint that enforcement of 
the Montana SAL violated their substantive due process rights by 
infringing upon their liberty interests and fundamental rights, and they 
strenuously protested the construction of their complaint as a takings 
claim. Id. at 870. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
actual harm alleged by the plaintiffs was their inability, due to the 
statute, to exclude others from their property. Because the right of 
landowners to exclude others is an essential private property right, the 
Court found that the alleged harms were addressed by the Takings 
Clause and that plaintiffs' claim was appropriately regarded as a takings 
claim. Id. at 870-71. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
because they sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages 
or compensation, their complaint could not be interpreted as a takings 
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suggesting that "the touching of a streambed by a wader is de minimis 
and causes no more interference with private property rights than does a 
floater." Id. at 1324. 
Although heavily relied on by Conatsers here, the Montana trial 
court's suggestion that walking on private property causes no more 
interference than not walking on the same property is simply illogical. 
As clearly borne out by Day, one activity constitutes an unlawful 
trespass while the other does not. Day, 362 P.2d at 146 ("[S]uch wading 
or walking is a trespass upon the lands belonging to the riparian owners 
and is unlawful. Such trespass cannot be made lawful either by 
legislative or judicial action."). 
Moreover, to suggest that intentionally walking along the bed of a 
river comports with the Montana Supreme Court's declaration that the 
public's utilization of the streambeds must be "narrowly confined so that 
impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals is minimal," is to 
eviscerate the meaning of the word "minimal." See Gait, 731 P.2d at 916. 
Minimal is generally defined as the "smallest or least possible." See 
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1145 (2d Ed. 1983). 
claim, stating that landowners are allowed to seek such equitable relief 
in order to resist takings that threaten to violate the Constitution. Id. 
The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint but did not consider the 
merits of a takings claim, presumably because the plaintiffs did not plead 
and specifically denied making such a claim. 
O / l 
Walking and wading on privately owned streambeds is not the "least 
possible* use of those streambeds. Rather, the least possible and only 
acceptable use of the privately owned streambeds, as held by the trial 
court in this action, the Day decision, and the most recent decision out 
of the Montana Supreme Court, is that contact which is merely 
incidental to floating upon the waters situated above those beds. 
Anything more is not minimal or incidental but instead a trespass. 
Although the four Montana cases are interesting, it must be noted 
that the earlier two were superseded when Montana's legislature enacted 
the SAL, and the more recent two involved challenges to the SAL. 
Importantly, other than Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, the Utah legislature 
has made no declaration regarding the public's right to make use of beds 
underlying non-navigable bodies of water. In addition, the scope of 
Montana" SAL, which governs the rights of the public to be upon water in 
Montana, has been called into considerable question by the most recent 
decision out of Montana' highest court, leaving Montana law, at least as 
it applies the correlative rights of landowners and recreationists, "adrift 
in a sea of confusion." Gait, 731 P.2d at 920 (J. Sheehy, dissenting). 
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D. USE OF THE STREAMBED IN THE MANNER ADVOCTED BY THE 
CONATSERS IS CLEARLY MORE THAN INCIDENTAL TO THE 
RIGHT TO BE UPON THE WATER AND ALLOWING SUCH WOULD 
RESULT IN AN OUTCOME THAT IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL 
PURPOSES UNMANAGEMABLE. 
The Conatsers contend that the public's easement to be upon the 
River necessarily includes the right to walk on its bed under the guise 
that "the owner of the easement is said to have all of the rights incident 
or necessary to its proper enjoyment." [Appellants' Brief at p. 18.] 
Though the concept of incidental rights is applicable to the case at hand, 
it cannot be employed so as to enlarge the public's easement to burden 
the servient subaqueous estate in the manner sought. See Nielson v. 
Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943) ("The right cannot be enlarged 
to place a greater burden or servitude on the property."); see also 25 Am. 
Jur . 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 81 (2006) (An 
easement holder "has the privilege to do such acts as are necessary to 
make effective his or her enjoyment of the easement, unless the burden 
on the servient tenement is thereby increased."). Moreover, the concept 
of incidental rights is already accounted for in the trial court's holding 
which expressly allows for contact with the streambeds, provided such 
contact is incidental to the public's right of floatation on the River. 
Anything more than incidental contact, therefore, exceeds the scope of 
the easement to be upon the water and is considered a trespass. This is 
in accordance with the Conatsers' own authorities. See, e.g., U.P.C. v. 
R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, If 41 , n.5, 990 P.2d 945 ("The owner 
of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its 
proper enjoyment, but nothing more. . . . If the easement owner exceeds 
his rights . . . he becomes a trespasser . . . .w) (quoting 25 Am. Jur . 2d 
Easements § 81 (1996)). 
As justification for imposing the additional burden of allowing the 
public to trespass on the privately owned streambed, the Conatsers 
contend that streambeds in question are already burdened by a variety of 
existing federal and state laws. [Appellants' Brief at p. 23.] Virtually all 
privately owned land is to some extent burdened by laws proscribing or 
prohibiting what can and cannot be done thereon. See, e.g., Am. Bush v. 
City ofS. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (recognizing that cities 
have the power to regulate the types of activities that can be undertaken 
at certain locations); Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 
1151 (recognizing that land ownership does not allow one to disregard 
county zoning ordinances); Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, 108 
P.3d 701 (upholding a zoning ordinance relating to the leasing of owner-
occupied property). But the fact that certain real property is already 
burdened by legal restrictions in one form or another, whether 
subaqueous or not, cannot serve as a justification for imposing 
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additional burdens on the property. This is particularly the case when 
the burden being imposed will necessarily result in a confiscation of the 
most valuable right in the bundle or rights referred to as property - the 
right to exclude others. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176. 
Under the Conatsers' theory, every streambed in the state of Utah, 
regardless of its size and usefulness for floating, would be subject to a 
public easement for walking and wading. As a necessary corollary to 
such an easement would be the restriction on the ability of all private 
landowners to exclude others from making use of their property, should 
that property unfortunately be in the form of a streambed. Because the 
state of Utah is literally crisscrossed by thousands of natural streams, 
creeks and rivers, some hardly worthy of being designated as such, all 
owners of property where one of these bodies is located would be subject 
to a public easement for anyone to walk across their property. In 
essence, every streambed in Utah will become a public thoroughfare. 
Such a result is not only unwise but, as a practical matter, 
unmanageable. The better-reasoned and more appropriate rule, as 
correctly determined by the trial court, is to allow the public to be upon 
the waters of this state when such waters are capable of being so used 
and to allow no more than incidental use of the streambeds underlying 
those waters. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellees respectfully submit that 
this Court should affirm the trial court's judgment determining that 
where the use of the privately owned streambed of the River is more than 
incidental to the right of floating thereon, such use constitutes a 
trespass. Appellees further request an award of their costs pursuant to 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
s DATED this Itf^ day of February, 2007. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Ronjkld G. RusJ 
Royce B. Covington, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellees 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify tha t on this 13 t h day of February, 2 0 0 7 , I caused to 
be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, two +~ir and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIM1 i U' MM'kLUihS, to each . .Axing: 
Michael M. Quealy (26b/) 
Robert H. Hughes (9787) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Gerald E. Neilson (2412) 
37373 Honeycut Rd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Parker M. Neilson [z<\ * ^ 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 841 I i 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Royce B. Covington, Esq. (10160) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown, 
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson, 
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR MORGAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JODICONATSER; KEVIN CONATSER; 




WAYNE JOHNSON; CLARK SESSIONS; 
SHANE E. MATTHEWS, Deputy Sheriff 
of Morgan County; DUANE JOHNSON; 
RANDY SESSIONS; MICHAEL 
McMILLAN; LYNN BROWN; GERALD 
STOUT; and JOHN AND JANE DOES, 
6-25, 
Defendants. 
The court having issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the reasons 
set forth therein, 
JUDGMENT 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs, as members of the public, if they can gain lawful access to the Weber 
River, have the right to float leisure craft and participate in any lawful activity when upon the 
water. 
2. The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the 
public's easement to float down the Weber River. 
3. The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent plaintiffs from 
utilizing the public's easement to float down the river. 
4. When floating upon the river, defendants may scrape or touch the river's bed by 
grounding of craft as a necessary incident to the use of the public's easement to float upon the 
river and do not commit a trespass thereby. 
5. The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles 
accompanies the right of floatation upon natural waters, which plaintiffs enjoy as members of the 
public. 
6. Plaintiffs may walk along the banks of the river to bypass a fence, obstacle, or 
danger in order to continue floating and so long as plaintiffs' actions are as minimally intrusive 
as possible of the private owners' land, there is no trespass. 
7. Where the use of the streambed is more than incidental to the right of floating on 
natural waters, such use would constitute a trespass. 
8. Wading or walking along the river, where such conduct is not incidental to the right 
of floatation upon natural waters, would constitute a trespass of private property rights. 
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9. Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the 
bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res.. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) 
and this Judgment. 
10. This declaratory Judgment is binding only on the parties to this action. 
11. Except as to the declaratory relief provided by this Judgment, all claims and causes 
of action herein are dismissed and this Judgment constitutes a final Judgment for all purposes. 
12. The parties shall bear their own costs. 
DATED this day of A^f. 2006. 
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Honorable Michael D. /Lyo 
District Court Judge 
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1 through and he reads the important part of, or recites the 
2 important part of Wyoming decision, which is irrespective of 
3 the ownership [inaudible] channel of waters and irrespective 
4 of their navigability the public has the right to use public 
5 waters of this State for floating useable craft - and I think 
6 that's the rule in Utah - and that use may not be interfered 
7 with or curtailed by any landowner* It's also the right of 
8 the public while so lawfully floating in the State's waters 
9 to lawfully hunt or fish or do any other things which are not 
10 otherwise made unlawful, and then it goes on to say that when 
11 waters aren't able to float craft they may be so used when so 
12 floating craft is a necessary incident to that use of the bed 
13 or channel the waters may be unavoidably scraped or touched. 
14 But again, on the other hand, where the use of a 
15 bed or channel is more than incidental to the right of 
16 floating use of the waters and the primary use is of the bed 
17 or channel rather than the floating, such wading or walking 
18 is a trespass upon lands belonging to riparian owner and is 
19 unlawful. 
20 Counsel for purposes of our case here has conceded 
21 that this is not, this is a non-navigable river. If it were 
22 navigable, the point of all that discussion in our memo is 
23 that navigability is important for distinguishing rights. If 
24 it's a class one navigable river, which we only have maybe 
25 I the Green River and Colorado River in the federal standards 
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1 in Utah and Utah Lake and Great Salt Lake, maybe Bear Lake 
2 naturally occurring navigable streams where those rights are 
3 recognized and the State owns the bottom, that was the, the 
4 equal footing doctrine when all of the western states came 
5 into union as part of that the state took the charters and 
6 enabled legislation passed by Congress gave the State's title 
7 to the riverbeds so that pioneers coming through into the 
8 west - and this shows you sort of your eastern mentality of 
9 what things were like here, the pioneers coming out west 
10 could use these corridors of transportation for commerce to 
11 be on equal footing with the State's in the east and, you 
12 know, that is I think a huge issue if there is a claim that 
13 the Weber River meets that standard because we believe that 
14 it clearly does not and is something that the Court can take 
15 judicial notice of. But since we have that concession I 
16 don't think we need to go there. If the Court's going to 
17 address the merits, then the merits would be based on the 
18 fact that this is a non-navigable river. We submit that the 
19 standard that was stated by the Day Court is applicable, that 
20 the landowners here do have the right to utilize their 
21 property in a way that they can exclude people from having 
22 access to the river over their land. But they can't exclude 
23 people from floating on the river or if there's incidental 
24 contact related to that, that's I think permissible. But 
25 walking around, stopping, getting out, fishing, walking up on 
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2005, defendants, excepting Shane E. Matthews, cross-moved for summary judgment. The court 
heard oral argument on both motions September 30, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by Gerald 
E. Nielson. Defendants were represented by Ronald G. Russell. After full consideration of the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 000500092PR 
motions, the memoranda of points and legal authorities filed therewith, the Affidavit of Kevin 
Conatser, and all other memoranda, pleadings, and papers on file with the court, the court makes 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about June 4,2000, plaintiffs put a rubber raft in the Weber River at a public 
access point and proceeded to float down the river to another public access point. 
2. Between the public access points, the river crosses parcels of private property. 
3. While floating the river, the plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways: 
(i) the raft in which they were riding touched or skidded along the bottom of the river in shallow 
areas, (ii) the paddles or oars touched the bottom on occasion, (iii) Kevin Conatser's fishing 
tackle came in contact with the bottom, and (iv) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft 
and walked along the streambed to facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been 
strung over the river. 
4. On at least two occasions prior to June 4, 2000, the defendants informed the 
plaintiffs that they were trespassing. On one occasion, defendant Michael McMillan confronted 
Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. On another occasion, Kevin Conatser was ordered 
off the river by Clark Sessions. 
5. On June 4,2000, defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson confronted the 
plaintiffs and ordered them off the river. Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson told 
the plaintiffs to pick up their raft out of the river and walk out via a parallel railroad easement. 
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6. The plaintiffs continued downstream to a public access point where the defendants 
Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson and a Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting. 
7. The deputy sheriff cited plaintiffs for criminal trespass. 
8. The Morgan County Justice Court later found plaintiffs guilty of criminal trespass. 
9. The plaintiffs appealed the justice court's findings. 
10. After appeal, the county moved to dismiss the trespass charges in light of the 
uncertainty regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers. 
11. There is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between the plaintiffs and 
defendants regarding the plaintiffs' rights to use the river. 
12. Both the plaintiffs and defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each sid 
believes the law provides to them. Their dispute comes not from a disregard of the law, but a 
genuine uncertainty as to their respective rights. 
13. The parties' dispute regarding use of the river has not ceased but has been placed 
on hold out of respect for the role of the courts. 
14. The parties have provided the court with no evidence of whether the river has been 
used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the court to declare the respective 
rights or status between parties. 
2. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to settle and afford relief from 
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. 
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3. The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to be remedial without requiring parties 
to get in serious trouble first and it is to be liberally administered. 
4. The following four requirements must be met before the court can issue a 
declaratory judgment: (i) there must be a justiciable controversy, (ii) parties whose interests are 
diverse, (iii) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking relief, and (iv) issues 
ripe for judicial determination. 
5. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows for a wide interpretation of what constitutes 
a justiciable controversy. This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial 
determination, between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time, 
regarding the rights and limitations of the plaintiffs when floating the river abutting and running 
over defendants' property. 
6. A justiciable controversy is present in this case. Because the plaintiffs' interests to 
the river are in direct conflict with the defendants' attempts to prevent the plaintiffs' use of the 
river, the parties are adverse. 
7. The issue here is ripe for determination. The plaintiffs have had clashes with the 
defendants presenting a concrete set of facts regarding the plaintiffs' actual use of the river. This 
case does not present an academic controversy and it is not an effort by plaintiffs to obtain an 
advisory opinion. 
8. The plaintiffs have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. The river 
belongs to the public and plaintiffs, as members of the public, have a legally protectible interest 
in the public easement over these natural waters free of defendants' interference. Plaintiffs have 
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repeatedly used a portion of the river. The defendants have interfered with the plaintiffs' use of 
the river. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted of criminal 
trespass, although the charges were later dismissed. 
9. The plaintiffs' interest is apart from the general public. The plaintiffs have 
repeatedly used a particular portion of the river, intend to continue doing so, and have suffered a 
particularized injury of interference. The defendants have individually interfered with the 
plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple occasions. 
10. A legally protectible interest does not require a property interest. 
11. A declaratory judgment will end the uncertainty and therewith the instant 
controversy. 
12. The plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of plaintiffs' and the public's 
rights to use the river and waters located in Utah; however, a declaratory judgment only settles 
the legal rights between the parties to the proceeding. The court's judgment will not exceed the 
plaintiffs' interests or prejudice any persons who have not been made a party to the proceeding. 
For this reason, the court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the plaintiffs. 
13. The court can only declare the rights to use of the river as between the plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
14. A fair determination as to the respective rights between the defendants and 
plaintiffs on claims arising from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a 
party to this case. Therefore, the State of Utah and the record owners of the property in question 
are not necessary parties. 
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15. The court denies plaintiffs' request for a declaration that the public has a right to 
walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Such a declaration would require the weighing of 
competing interests and is a matter better left for the legislature. 
16. A declaratory judgment will end the present controversy. This case is ideally 
situated to the stated purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. This case is properly before the 
court and a declaration of the respective rights between the plaintiffs and defendants is 
appropriate. 
17. The declaration made by the court in this case is binding only on those made 
parties hereto and no one else. 
18. The court exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment in this case 
because it feels that it is the place of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between 
the parties and to facilitate a peaceful co-existence. Otherwise, people resort to self-help and 
anarchy. 
19. This case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability. 
20. All waters in the state are the property of the public. Individuals, therefore, have 
no ownership interest in natural waters. 
21. The public does not trespass when upon natural waters, regardless of who owns the 
bed beneath the water. 
22. Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and irrespective of the navigability of the 
water, the public, if it can gain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure craft 
and participate in any lawful activity when upon the water. 
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23. The right to be on public waters applies to the section of the river at issue in this 
case. 
24. The defendants have no legal right to prevent plaintiffs from making use of the 
public's easement to float down the river. 
25. The defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the plaintiffs from 
utilizing the public's easement to float down the river. 
26. When floating down the river, a person may scrape or touch the river's bed by 
grounding of craft. These are necessary incidents to the use of the easement and do not 
constitute trespass. 
27. The right to disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles 
accompanies the right of floatation on natural waters. 
28. A person may walk along the banks in order to bypass a fence, obstacle, or danger 
in order to continue floating. 
29. Provided a person is as minimally intrusive of the private owners' land as possible 
there is no trespass. 
30. Where the use of the streambed is more that incidental to the right of floating on 
natural waters, such use constitutes a trespass. 
31. Plaintiffs have the right to make use of the river provided they stay within the 
bounds of the holding of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of Wildlife Res.. 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) 
and this decision. 
32. This decision is binding only on the parties hereto. 
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33. The court will enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the foregoing 
conclusions. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of faff. 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
u 
Honorable Michael D/L^n 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Gerald E. Nielson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
Royce B. Covington, Esq. of 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants Lynn Brown, 
Duane Johnson, Wayne Johnson, 
Michael McMillan, and Randy Sessions 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (^ -^day of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Gerald E. Nielson, Esq. 
3737 Honeycut Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kelly W. Wright, Esq. 
Post Office Box 886 
48 West Young Street 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Brent A. Bohman, Esq. 
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3 
Post Office Box 120 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Ronal 
Brent A. Bohman (#4275) 
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3 
P.O. Box 120 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Attorney for Wayne Johnson, Clark Sessions, 
Duane Johnson, Randy Session, Michael McMillan 
and Lynn Brown 
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LACEY CONATSER, and NICOLE MANN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WAYNE JOHNSON, CLARK SESSION, 
SHANE E. MATTHEWS, Deputy Sheriff of 
Morgan County, DUANE JOHNSON, 
RANDY SESSION, MICHAEL McMILLAN, 
LYNN BROWN, GERALD STOUT, JOHN 




Civil No.: 500092 
Judge W. Brent West 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF /tyfrvCLis/i 
ss. 
) 
I, Randy Sessions, being first duly sworn, do hereby state as follows: 
1. I am a defendant in the above captioned lawsuit wherein Plaintiffs seek a 
declaratory order determining the right of the public in and to the bed of the Weber River. 
00042 
2. Contrary to the allegations of the Complaint, however, I do not personally 
own or claim to own any interest in any lands which constitute the bed of the Weber 
River. 
3. Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this ^ 1 day of July, 2001. 
< ^ t ^ ^ Q r > i ~ 
Randy Sessions 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, RANDY SESSIONS, on this 9- 6 
_ -tr" 
day of July, 2001. 
My Commission Expires: 
NotQTJSbh^ ? * 
X&» •'*•?. JAYNE K THOMPSON 
£ &S&& *o»wir mm • STATE oi m 
%Mj 
WW 
5015 WEST OLD HWY RO 
MORGAN, UT 84050 
COMM. EXR 01-06-2003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Jf 
I hereby certify that on this *%Q day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Randy Sessions be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Gerald E. Nielson 
3737 Honeycut Road 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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Judge Michael D. Lyon 
This action for a declaratory judgment arises out of a dispute between these 
parties regarding the Plaintiffs' rights to use a portion of the Weber River. The Plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment on September 17,2002. The Court previously granted a 
motion to dismiss Defendant Shane E. Matthews. On September 30, 2005, the remaining 
Defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the Defendants' claims. The Court 
heard oral argument on September 30,2005. Following the hearing, both parties 
submitted supplemental briefs on the issue of Plaintiffs' standing. Having now carefully 
considered the parties' briefs and having heard argument, the Court denies the 






The relevant facts are not in dispute. On or about June 4,2000, Plaintiffs put a 
rubber raft in the Weber River at a public access point and proceeded to float down the 
river to another public access point where they exited the river. Between the public 
access points, the river crosses parcels of property that are in private ownership. 
Plaintiffs touched the streambed in the following ways: (1) the raft in which they rode 
touched or skidded along the bottom in shallow areas, (2) their paddles or oars touched 
the bottom on occasion, (3) Plaintiff Kevin Conatser's fishing tackle came in contact with 
the bottom, (4) Kevin Conatser intentionally got out of the raft, and walked along the 
bottom of the river to facilitate his fishing and to manipulate fencing that had been strung 
over the river by the property owners. 
On two occasions prior to June 4, 2000, the Defendants told the Plaintiffs that 
they were trespassing. On June 4,2000, Defendants Duane Johnson and Wayne Johnson 
confronted the Plaintiffs and ordered Plaintiffs off of the river. Specifically, Duane and 
Wayne Johnson told the Plaintiffs to pick up their raft and walk out via a parallel railroad 
easement. The Plaintiffs refused to walk out and continued downstream to a public 
access point, where the Johnsons and the Morgan County Deputy Sheriff were waiting 
for them. The Deputy Sheriff cited Mr. and Mrs. Conatser for criminal trespass. The 
Morgan County Justice Court found the Plaintiffs guilty. After Plaintiffs appeal to the 
district court, the county moved to dismiss the charges because of the uncertainty 





A. Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements to Seek a Declaratory Judgment 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes the Court to declare the respective 
rights or status between parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1. The purpose of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act is to "settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity 
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations" and it is to be liberally 
administered. Id. at § 78-33-12; Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119,121 
(Utah 1977) (stating that courts "will be indulgent in entertaining actions to achieve [the 
Act's] objective). Nevertheless, four requirements must be met before the Court can give 
a declaratory judgment: "(1) there must be a justiciable controversy, (2) parties whose 
interests are adverse, (3) a legally protectible interest residing with the party seeking 
relief, and (4) issues ripe for judicial determination." Miller v Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 
(Utah 2003) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1148 (Utah 1983)). 
The Declaratory Judgment Act "allows for a wide interpretation of what 
constitutes a justiciable controversy." Salt Lake Co. Comm'n v. Short, 985 P.2d 899, 903 
(Utah 1999). It is sufficient that the parties are adverse, the plaintiff asserts a bona fide 
claim, and the issues are ripe for adjudication. Id. In this case, the parties are adverse as 
the Plaintiffs' interests to be on the river are directly in conflict with the Defendants' 
attempts to prevent the Plaintiffs' use. 
An issue is ripe for determination when it has "sharpened into an actual or 
imminent clash of rights" and where the issue presents a concrete set of facts. Pett v. 
AutolivASP, Inc , 106 P.3d 705, 706 (stating that a mere difference of opinion regarding 




themselves is unripe). The Plaintiffs have had actual clashes with the Defendants on 
several occasions. This case presents a concrete set of facts regarding the Plaintiffs' 
actual use of this portion of the Weber River. This case does not present an academic 
controversy or require an advisory opinion. 
The Plaintiffs must also have a legally protectible interest in the controversy. A 
legally protectible interest is "one that the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or 
being owned by the party." Alternative Options and Services for Children v. Chapman, 
106 P.3d 744, 750 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (quoting In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 
1074 (Utah 2000)). This requires that the plaintiff have an interest that is distinct from 
that shared by the general public. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-50 (holding that the airing of 
generalized grievances and the vindication of public rights are properly addressed to the 
legislature). In Jenkins, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating that public 
schools could not hire state legislators. Id. at 1148. The court held that plaintiffs 
reliance on his status as a taxpayer and citizen "d[id] nothing to distinguish himself from 
any member of the public at large," and that the plaintiff did not claim any particularized 
injury. Id. at 1151 (stating that plaintiff lacked the harm that persons living in the 
affected school districts or legislative districts would have). 
In this case, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly used a portion of the Weber River. The 
Defendants have individually interfered with Plaintiffs' use of the river on multiple 
occasions. Plaintiffs Kevin Conatser and Jodi Conatser were arrested and convicted, 
although dismissed on de novo appeal, of criminal trespass in the justice court. Although 
the Plaintiffs share an interest in using Utah's natural waters with the general public, the 




continue doing so, and have suffered particularized injury of interference, which sets 
them apart from the general public. 
A legally protectible interest requires that Plaintiffs' interest be protectible. 
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (Utah 2003). Once given, a declaratory judgment 
must be able to provide specific relief. Id. In Miller, the plaintiffs sought a declaration 
that a teacher's classroom conduct was unconstitutional. Id. The court refused to give a 
declaratory judgment because its declaration would not terminate the uncertainty or end 
the controversy. Id. The court noted that a declaratory judgment would not serve a 
useful purpose as the teacher would remain employed, students would continue to be 
placed in her class, and the school board would still have the discretion to refuse action 
on the plaintiffs' complaints. Id. The Defendants argue that a legally protectible interest 
requires some property interest. The Court disagrees. Here, the Plaintiffs seek a 
declaration of the respective rights between themselves and these Defendants. The Court 
finds that there is a longstanding and continuing uncertainty between these parties 
regarding Plaintiffs' rights to use this portion of the river. Both the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants have actively sought to assert the rights each side believes the law provides to 
them. Their dispute comes not from a disregard of the law, but a genuine uncertainty as 
to their respective rights. A declaratory judgment will end this uncertainty and therewith 
the controversy. 
The Plaintiffs have requested a broad declaration of the public's rights to rivers 
and waters in Utah. A declaratory judgment only settles the legal rights between the 
parties to the proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11. The Court's judgment will not 




proceeding. For this reason, the Court cannot consider the broad relief requested by the 
Plaintiffs. The Court will only declare the Plaintiffs' rights to use the river with respect 
to these Defendants. Similarly, the Defendants argued that the State of Utah and the 
record owners of the property in question are necessary parties. However, a fair 
determination as to the respective rights between these particular parties on claims arising 
from their own behavior will not prejudice any person not made a party to this case. 
The Plaintiffs have asked the Court to declare as a matter of law that the public 
has the right to walk along the beds of streams and rivers. Plaintiffs cite to Montana law, 
which has recognized this right. See Montana Code Ann. § 23-2-301 et seq. Declaring 
such a right would require the weighing of competing interests that is better left for the 
legislature. The Court, therefore, denies this relief. 
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to resolve controversies and 
uncertainty. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. The act is intended to be remedial without 
requiring parties to get in serious trouble first. Alternative Options and Services for 
Children, 106 P.3d at 749. Prior to June 4,2000, Defendant Michael McMillan 
confronted Kevin Conatser and ordered him off the river. Kevin Conatser's Aff. at f 3. 
On another occasion prior to June 4,2000, Clark Sessions acting for Randy Sessions 
ordered Kevin Conatser off of the river. Id. at If 4. There have been threats of violence 
between these parties. Verified Complaint at f 11. The Conatser's were arrested and 
convicted of criminal trespass. The Court finds that there has been a continuing 
controversy between these parties for years. The Defendants argue that because the 
hostilities and use of the river have ceased, a declaratory judgment is inappropriate. 




hold out of respect for the role of the courts. A declaratory judgment will end this 
controversy. This case is ideally suited to the stated purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. The Court, therefore, concludes that this case is properly before the Court 
and that a declaration of the respective rights between these parties is appropriate. 
B. Plaintiffs' Use of the Public Easement to Float on Natural Waters Does Not 
Constitute a Trespass 
The parties urge the Court to make a determination of the navigability of the 
Weber River. The parties have provided the Court with no evidence of whether the 
Weber River has ever been used for commerce or of the river's capability to be so used. 
The Court, therefore, will not address navigability on this motion. However, as discussed 
below, this case does not require either a determination of bed ownership or navigability. 
"All waters" in this state are the property of the public. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1. 
Individuals, therefore, have no ownership interest in natural waters. The Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized a public easement over natural waters. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. of 
Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). The public does not trespass when upon 
natural waters, regardless of who owns the bed beneath the water. Id. "Irrespective of 
the ownership of the bed and irrespective of navigability of the water, the public, if it can 
obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and 
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." Id. (citing Day v. Armstrong, 
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). This right to be on public waters applies to the section of the 
Weber River at issue in this case. The Defendants have no legal right to prevent the 




Defendants have no legal right to erect fences to prevent the Plaintiffs from utilizing the 
public's easement to float down the river. 
When floating on natural waters, a person may scrape the river bed or touch the 
bed by the grounding of craft. Day, 362 P.2d at 146. These are necessary incidents to the 
use of that easement and do not constitute a trespass. Id. at 145-46. Even the "right to 
disembark and pull, push, or carry over shoals, rapids, or obstacles accompany the right 
of flotation" on natural waters. Id at 146. A person may walk along the banks in order 
to bypass an obstacle or danger in order to continue floating. Id. As long as the person is 
as minimally intrusive on the private owner's land as possible there is no trespass. Id. 
However, where the use of the stream bed is more than incidental to the right of 
floating on natural waters, the use constitutes a trespass. Id. This would include wading 
or walking along the river. In this case, the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Kevin 
Conatser, never left their raft and, therefore, did not trespass on the property in question. 
When Kevin Conatser got back in his raft he was no longer trespassing. Walking out 
along the parallel railroad easement was unnecessary. These rights are both already 
recognized in Utah and in line with the clear majority of western states. 
Conclusion 
This case presents a justiciable controversy, ripe for judicial determination, 
between private citizens whose interests are adverse, and have been so over time, 
regarding the rights and limitations of the Plaintiffs when floating the Weber River 
abutting the Defendants' property. The Weber River belongs to the public, and the 




easement over these natural waters, free of Defendants' interference, provided they stay 
within the bounds of the holding of JJ.N.P. Co. 
In granting the circumscribed relief found in this decision, the Court settles the 
longstanding and continuing uncertainty and insecurity concerning the parties' rights to 
the river. In doing so, it declares the rights of the parties only, no one else. The Court 
exercises its discretion to grant a declaratory judgment because it feels that it is the place 
of a court to obviate future potential confrontations between the parties and to facilitate a 
peaceful co-existence. If courts do not act in these situations in society, people resort to 
self-help and anarchy. 
The Court requests that Mr. Russell prepare the appropriate findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment. 
Dated this \tf day of December, 2005. 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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Counsel for Defendants (excepting Shane Matthews) 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
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DeputyEojirt Clerk 
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655 P.2d 1133 
655 P.2d 1133 
(fife as:655P,2d 113?) 
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J.J.N.P. Co. \ State, Hy din! riiimifli hi I 
Wildlife ResourcesUtah,1982. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
J.J.N.P. COMPANY, a Utah corporation, PlainMf 
and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, By and Through its DI V ISION OF 
WII DLIFE RESOURCES, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 17183. 
Sept.. 22, 1982. 
Owner of land surrounding lake appealed from, a 
judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, David B. Dee, J., upholding the Division of 
Wildlife Resources' denial of a permit to establish a 
private fish installation, entering a declaratory 
judgment that the public had recreational rights in the 
waters of the lake even though it was entirely 
surrounded by landowners1 property, and ruling that a 
dirt road crossing the property was a public road. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) the 
public had recreational rights in the waters of the lake 
even though it was entirely surrounded by 
landowners' property; (2) the statute prohibiting 
private fish installations on natural watercourses, but 
allowing them on man-made watercourses, did not 
deny equal protection; and (3) where the issue of the 
dirt road was not raised in the pleadings, but was 
tried by mutual consent, there was no error in 
deciding that issue. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
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which state regulates use of water for benefit 
well-being of people. 
I l l Navigable Waters 270 €=>16 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl 5 Navigation 
270kl6k. In Gem .. Most Cited Cases 
Navigable Waters 270 €=>36(5) 
270 Navigable Waters 
270II Lands Under Water 
270k36 Ownership and Control n . »< d 
270k36(5) k. Trespass to Subnn .^ ;mds, 
and Actions Therefor. Most Cited Cases 
Corollary of proposition that public owns water is 
rule that there is public easement over water 
regardless of who owns water beds beneath water and 
therefore, public waters do not trespass in areas 
where they naturally appear, and public does not 
trespass when upon such waters. 
181 Navigable Waters 270 €=*16 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl5 Navigation 
270kl6 k. In General Most Cited. Cases 
Navigable Waters 270 €^>29 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270k28 Public Uses Other Than Navigation 
270k29 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Irrespective of ownership of land and navigability of 
water, public, if it can obtain lawful access to body of 
water, has right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and 
participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that 
water. 
191 Waters and Water Courses 405 € ^ 1 0 9 
405 Waters and Water Courses 
405IV Natural Lakes and Ponds 
4Q5kl09 k. Nature and Extent of ,E ipai ian 
Rights in General. Most Cited Cases 
Ownership of all lands surrounding lake did not 
CC* '"' ' ' -T . 
riOl Waters and W ater Courses 405 0=>36 
405 Waters and Watei Courses 
' vch.nai Water Courses 
40511(A) Riparian Rights in General 
405k36 k. Power to Control and Regulate 
Water Courses. Most Cited Cases 
State need not show compelling state interest to 
justify discrimination between natural and unnatural 
watercourses. 
[Ill Constitutional Law .92 €^>213.1(2) 
92 Constitutional Law 
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws 
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination Affected in 
General 
92k213.1(2) k. Rational or Reasonable 
•s; Relation to Object or Compelling Interest. 
Most Cited Cases 
Compelling state interest need be demonstrated only 
when discrimination affects fundamental rights or 
when suspect classifications are involved. 
11} I Constitutional Law 92 €>=>213,1(2) 
92 Constitutional Law 
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws 
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination.. / VJ'lei tc-d in 
General 
92k213.1(2) k. Rational or Reasonable 
Basis; Relation to Object, or Compelling Interest. 
Most Cited Cases 
When neither fundamental right nor suspect. 
classification is involved,' equal protection requires 
that statutory classifications bear reasonable relation 
to purpose sought to be accomplished and that there 
be reasonable basis for distinction between classes 
and classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary 
as long as similarly situated people are dealt with in 
similar manner and people situated differently are not 
treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
i .egislation 
92k208(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
.-^gislative classifications need not be applied with 
• ithematical exactness, 
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1141 < nnslili i lmiiii l II i <M % 7tl!H|lli|i 
92 Constitutional Law 
92X Class Legislation 
92k208 Class Legislation 
92k208(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Classification may be rea.son.able even, though some 
inequality results. 
1|SJ I m i ' I I n l ; i l II in M2*5 " Ml,«l I lllliil " I 
92 Constitutional Law 
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws 
92k213.1 Bases for Discrimination Affected in 
General. 
92k213.1(2) k. ivdu,..i.i e 
Basis; Relation to Object or OV t. 
Most Cited Cases 
Discrimination 
reasonable basis for classification. 
1 ) 
176k9 k. COILS, 
Most Cited Cases 
Statute prohibiting operation ri , • ate fish 
installations on natural waters or on reservoirs 
constructed on natural stream channels, but allowing 
such installations on man-made watercourses, did not 
deny equal protection, notwithstanding fact that State 
allowed such private fish installations where 
installations were constructed prior to effective date 
of statute, U.C.A.1953. 23-15-10. 
1181 Appeal and E r r o r 30 € = ^ 8 8 9 ( 3 ) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
3QXVKD) Amendments 
30k889 Amendments Regarded as Made 
30k889(3) k. To Conform to Evidence or 
Correspond with V e ^ i* * * nr * > • -i <•> m/» n t. Most Cited 
Cases 
There was no error in deciding issue tried by mutual 
consent though it was not raised in pleadings. 
• <eiit of 
n^itutional 
92 C( i-rial U\v 
9211 Construction, Ope:.-, 
Constitutional Provisions 
92k44 Determina:* ^ 
Questions 
92k48 Presumptions and V-norn.-t'on in 
Favor of Constitutionals 
92k48(4) Appiiv^in s. -
 4 macular 
Legislation or Action *-r to Particular Constitutional 
Questions 
92k48(6) k Classification, 
Uniformity and Discrimination; Special or Local. 
Laws. Most Cited Cases 
Presumption of constitutionality is extended to 
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on 
suspect classifications, and that presumption is 
sufficient to sustain constitutionality of classification 
created by statute unless classification creates 
invidious discrimination or bears no rational 
relationship to legitimate state purpose. 
U21 Constitutional Law lLl2 <^23<> 
92 Constitutional Law 
92X1 Equal Protection of Laws 
92k236 k. Game and Fish Laws. Most Cited 
Cases 
Fish. 176 € = > 9 
176 Fish 
' l IO-M-i l l : -
md appellant. 
ivoi;crt B. Hansen, Richard i i>aii n \\ 
Jensen, Michael M. QueaL " i t . 
defendant and respondent 
STEWART, Justice: 
JJ .N.P. Co. brought this at-tion . naiJengin^ >r, ^.,I..J 
protection grounds, the constitutionality of U.C.A., 
1953. S 23-15-10r m which prohibits the operation 
of private fish installations on natural waters or on 
reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels. 
The plaintiff also challenges the Division of Wildlife 
Resources' denial of a permit to establish a private 
fish installation and the trial court's adjudication of 
the State's claim that a dirt road crossing plaintiffs 
property is a public road. The State of Utah 
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the 
public has recreational rights in the waters of a 
natural lake even though it is entirely surrounded by 
plaintiffs land. The trial court ruled in favor of the 
State on all. issues. We affirm, 
states: 
:
- • -rilawful for any person to develop or 
wj^mi; a private fish installation without 
..first securing a certificate of registration 
from the division of wildlife resources and 
payment of fees as specified by the wildlife 
board. This private fish installation must be 
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operated undei the rules and regulations 
specified by the wildlife board, and no such 
installation shall be developed on natural 
lakes or natural flowing streams, or 
reservoirs constructed on natural stream 
channels. 
J.J.N.P., a limited partnership created under the laws 
of Utah, owns approximately 1200 acres in Lake 
Canyon, Duchesne County. Lake Canyon Lake is a 
natural lake surrounded on all sides by property 
owned by J.J.N.P. The lake is approximately 800 
yards long and 200 yards wide, with a mean depth of 
17 feet and a maximum depth of 33 feet. The lake is 
fed by natural springs in its bed and a small stream 
approximately 24 to 36 inches wide and 3 inches 
deep at full course, with headwaters approximately 
six miles above the lake on State land. A stream of 
similar size flows intermittently out of the lake 
during high water levels for approximately 300 yards 
before it disappears into the ground. 
Prior to 1978, the State had an agreement with 
J.J.N.P.'s predecessors in interest allowing public 
access to the lake across their land.— The State 
managed the lake, eliminated trash fish, stocked 
trout, and set and enforced fishing seasons and limits. 
When this agreement expired, J.J.N.P. filed an 
application with the Division of Wildlife Resources 
for a permit for a private fish installation. The 
Division denied the application pursuant to § 23-15-
10, which provides in part that "no such [private fish] 
installation shall be developed on natural waters or 
natural flowing streams, or reservoirs constructed on 
natural stream channels." 
FN2. The record does not include a copy of 
the lease executed between JJ.N.P.'s 
predecessor in interest and the State of Utah. 
Testimony at trial, however, indicated that 
under the terms of the lease, the State 
managed the waters and performed certain 
duties with the permission of the owners. 
Seven miles below Lake Canyon Lake is another 
natural lake known as "Lower Lake" which sustains a 
private fish installation. At trial, Donald Andriano, 
Chief of Fisheries for the Division of Wildlife 
Resources, testified that the initial permit authorizing 
this fishery was issued before the Legislature enacted 
§ 23-15-10 in 1971 and that the Division renewed 
the permits yearly because the owner had made 
substantial investments in the lake property. 
Andriano testified that fewer than six such permits 
for pnvaic :^ ii.*>h ; 
issued annua IK 
A gravel road extends u-.a, .„.. mwuw.
 v> Lake 
Canyon past Lake Canyon Lake to U.S. Forest 
Service lands. For more than ten years, Duchesne 
County graded and maintained the road for public 
use. J.J.N.P. attempted to restrict access to its *1136 
lands, and necessarily the government lands beyond, 
by placing a gate across the gravel road. County 
officials and others removed the obstructions within 
24 hours, and J.J.N.P. abandoned the effort. 
I . R I G H T : * ..i-,4.. - ; i 
[1][2][3] The Stale m its counterclaim asserts that 
Lake Canyon Lake is navigable and therefore subject 
to a public servitude for recreational use. Although 
"navigability" is a standard used to determine title to 
waterbeds, Monroe v. State. I l l Utah L 175 P.2d 
759 (19461 it does not establish the extent of the 
State's interest in the waters of the State. See 
Comment, Basis for the Legal Establishment of a 
Public Right of Recreation in Utah's "Non-
Navigable" Waters, 5 J.Contemp.L. 95 (1978). 
Section 73-1-1 states: "All waters in this state, 
whether above or under the ground are hereby 
declared to be the property of the public, subject to 
all existing rights to the use thereof." (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, individuals have no ownership 
interest as such in natural waters, only the right to put 
the water to certain uses. m "Beneficial use shall be 
the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the 
use of water in this state," § 73-1-3, and the right to 
beneficial use may be acquired only by compliance 
with the legal procedures for appropriation of a given 
right. But appropriation does not confer an 
ownership interest in the water itself. Daniels 
Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co.. Utah, 571 P.2d 
1323 (1977): Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water 
& Elec. Power Co.. 24 Utah 249. 67 P. 672 (1902). 
FN3. In Adams v. Portage Irrigation. 
Reservoir & Power Co.. 95 Utah 1. 72 P.2d 
648 (1937), this Court stated: 
Waters in this state are of two classes, public 
waters and private waters. The latter class 
is not only subject to exclusive control and 
ownership, but may be used, sold, or wasted. 
It: consists of such waters only as have been 
reduced to actual, physical possession of an 
individual by being taken into his vessels or 
storage receptacles. It is private property 
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and may be .: /. Public 
waters, on th* . the subject 
of larceny \ *u mereto is in the public; 
all are equal i ^neis. that is. have coequal 
rights therein, and -JIIL cannot obtain the 
exclusive control thereof. These waters are 
the gift of Providence; they belong to all as 
nature placed them or made them available. 
They are the waters flowing in natural 
channels or ponded in natural lakes and 
reservoirs. The title thereto is not subject to 
private acquisition and barter, even by the 
federal government or the state itself.... no 
title to the corpus of the water itself has been 
or can be granted, while it is naturally 
flowing, any more than it can to the air or 
the winds or the sunshine. "Such water," 
says Blackstone, "is a movable, wandering 
thing," ... like wild birds on the wing. 
Id. at 11. 72 P.2d at 652-53. See also 
Deseret Livestock v. Sharp. 123 Utah 353, 
259 P.2d 607 (1953). 
[4] [5] [6] The State regulates the use of the water, in 
effect, as trustee for the benefit of the people. Tanner 
v. Bacon. 103 Utah 494. 516. 136 P.2d 957. 966-967 
(1943) (Larson, J., concurring). Accord Day v. 
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (1961): see also Ne-
Bo-Shone Association v. Hogarth, 1 F.Supp. 885 
(W.D.Mich.1934). affd, 81 F.2d 70 (6th Or. 1936). 
Public ownership is founded on the principle that 
water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of 
the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the 
people; and the State must therefore assume the 
responsibility of allocating the use of water for the 
benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a 
whole. The doctrine of public ownership is the basis 
upon which the State regulates the use of water for 
the benefit and well being of the people. Marks v. 
Whitney. 6 Cal.3d 251. 491 P.2d 374. 98 Cal.Rptr. 
790(1971). 
[7] A corollary of the proposition that the public 
owns the water is the rule that there is a public 
easement over the water regardless of who owns the 
water beds beneath the water. Therefore, public 
waters do not trespass in areas where they naturally 
appear, and the public does not trespass when upon 
such waters. Day v. Armstrong, Wvo., 362 P.2d 137 
(1961). Furthermore, state policy recognizes an 
interest of the public in the use of state waters for 
recreational purposes by requiring that recreational 
uses be considered by the State Engineer before he 
approves an application for appropriation, § 73-3-8, 
or permits the relocation of a stream., § 73-3-29. 
*1137 [8] Private ownership of the land underlying 
natural lakes and streams does not defeat the State's 
power to regulate the use of the water or defeat 
whatever right the public has to be on the water. 
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and 
navigability of the water, the public, if it can obtain 
lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float 
leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful 
activity when utilizing that water. Day v. 
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (1961): Southern 
Idaho Fish and Game Association v. Picabo 
Livestock. Inc.. 96 Idaho 360. 528 P.2d 1295 (1974). 
FN4 
I 'N4 i\ number of state jurisdictions have 
found a public right to recreation in public 
waters: California, People v. Sweetser, 72 
Cal.App.3d 278. 140 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1977): 
People v. Mack. 19 Cal.App.3d 1040. 97 
Cal.Rptr. 448 (1971): Idaho, Southern 
Idaho Fish and Game Assrn v. Picabo 
Livestock. Inc.. 96 Idaho 360. 528 P.2d 1295 
(1974): Minnesota, Johnson v. Seifert. 257 
Minn. 159. 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960): 
Missouri, Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 
269 S.W.2d 17 (1954): New Mexico. State 
v. Red River Valley Co.. 51 N.M. 207. 182 
P.2d 421 (1945): North Dakota. Roberts v. 
Taylor. 47 N.D. 146. 181 N.W. 622 (1921): 
Oklahoma, Curry v. Hill. 460 P.2d 933 
(1969): Oregon, Luscher v. Reynolds. 153 
Or. 625. 56 P.2d 1158 (1936): South 
Dakota, Hillebrand v. Knapp. 65 S.D. 414. 
274 N.W. 821 (1937): Washington. Snivelv 
v. Jaber. 48 Wash.2d 815. 296 P.2d 1015 
(1956). Kemp v. Putnam. 47 Wash.2d 530. 
288 P.2d 837 (1955): Wyoming, Day v. 
Armstrom. 362P.2d 137 (1961). 
*t - ' i U o i - . J . J I s s. i d i U i u - s i i l_ i i* - . % > ID i . . < i i V v V ,111 Y C . i l 
based solely on its ownership of the 
surrounding land. It has no tight of appropiiation 
granted by the State bngmee: lo permit the 
acquisition of water rights in the manner claimed 
would violate the public ownership doctrine and the 
state statutes regulating appropriation. State water 
law excludes every means of appropriation except by 
application to the State Engineer. U.C.A.. 1953. § 
73-3-1. 
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J. J.N .P. attacks § 23-15-10 on equal protection 
grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. The argument is that the 
statutory classification which prohibits private fish 
installations on natural watercourses, reservoirs on 
such watercourses, and lakes, but allows them on 
manmade watercourses, constitutes an 
unconstitutional discrimination. It is also contended 
that the State, in allowing a private fish installation 
on Lower Lake, a natural watercourse, discriminates 
against J J.N.P. In addition, plaintiff argues that § 
23-15-10, read in light of § 23-20-14, which 
empowers property owners to exclude hunters and 
fishermen from their property,, is unreasonable and 
arbitrary 
flO][ll] As part of its equal protection argument, 
J.J.N.P. contends that the State must show a 
compelling state interest to justify a discrimination 
between natural and unnatural watercourses. The 
argument is without merit. A compelling state 
interest need be demonstrated only when the 
discrimination affects fundamental rights or when 
suspect classifications are involved. Utah Public 
Employees' Association v. State, Utah, 610 P.2d 1272 
(1980). The building or maintaining of a private fish 
installation on public water is not a fundamental 
right, and the restriction of such installations to 
manmade watercourses is not. a suspect classification. 
[12][13][[14][15] When neither a fundamental right 
nor a suspect classification is involved, equal 
protection requires that statutory classifications bear 
a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be 
accomplished and that there be a reasonable basis for 
the distinction between the classes. Classifications 
are not unreasonable or arbitrary as long as similarly 
situated people are dealt with in a similar manner and 
people situated differently are not treated as if their 
circumstances were the same. Abrahamsen v. 
Industrial Commission. 3 Utah 2d 289. 283 P.2d 213 
(1955): State v. Mason. 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 
(1938). Legislative classifications need not be 
applied with mathematical exactness. Baker v. 
Matheson. Utah. 607 P.2d 233 (1979). A 
classification may be reasonable even though some 
inequality results. Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 
Utah. 552 P.2d 646 (1976). Thus, *1138 the law 
holds a discrimination invalid only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the classification. Leetham v. 
McGinn. Utah. 524 P.2d 323 (1974); Justice v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co.. 12 Utah 2d 357. 366 P.2d 
974 (1961). 
[16] A presumption of constitutionality is extended to 
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on 
suspect classifications, and that presumption is 
sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the 
classification created by a statute unless the 
classification creates an. invidious discrimination or 
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state 
purpose. Baker v. Matheson. Utah, 607 P.2d 233 
(1979); Purdie v. University of Utah. Utah. 584 P.2d 
831 (1978); San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 93 S.Ct. 1278. 36 L.Ed.2d 
16(1973). 
[17] In prohibiting private fish installations on natural 
courses, j§ 23-15-10 does not impose an 
•ous discrimination. The State has the right, as 
r
 <^f all waters in the State, to prevent private 
om using public waters for private uses, 
ommercial or otherwise. The statute in 
j K»n nrotects that right and serves to preserve 
; for public use and enjoyment, 
> v^  who owns the bed or surrounding land. 
ore, the State may lawfully prevent the 
bjects in the water, such as would 
. « fishery, to preserve the natural 
.es and to protect whatever native 
wildlife may make use of the water. Fisheries on.. 
appropriated waters in manmade channels do not 
interfere with any of the above purposes. We 
conclude that § 23-15-10 promotes legitimate state 
interests and that the classification between natural 
and manmade watercourses is reasonable. It follows 
that the statute is constitutional 
Furthermore, L.LN ;! -- iu d a-!h-i-.;iit position than 
parties who operate private fish installations on 
unnatural watercourses. For water to reach unnatural 
watercourses it must, be appropriated and. diverted. 
Appropriated water is to be used for the purposes 
stated in the application. J.J.N.P. has limited water 
rights in. the water ," but it does not own the water in 
the lake even though the lake is surrounded by 
J.J.N.P. land. 
FN5. J.J.N.P. does possess a diligence claim 
entitling it to use Lake Canyon Lake water 
for watering cattle. J.J.N.P. has applied to 
the State Engineer to appropriate water for 
irrigation of its land, but the record does not 
show that this application has been 
approved. 
J.J.I IP.'s furthei contention that the fish installation 
on I ,ower Lake violates its right to equal protection is 
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also unpei suasive. Section 23-15-10 was enacted in 
1971, after the Lower Lake installation was built. 
The statute contains no express grandfather provision 
for fish installations on natural watercourses existing 
at the time of passage of the act. However, the 
statute does differentiate between old and new fish 
installations. As to the latter, the statute prohibits 
the development of all new installations on natural 
waters. As to the former, fish installations that 
already existed in natural water at the time the act 
was passed could continue to operate under 
certification by the Division of Wildlife Resources. 
The Division, congruent with the act, has annually 
renewed the Lower Lake permit in recognition of the 
owner's financial investment in, the then existing 
facilities. 
J.J.N.P. also argues that § 23-15-10, in prohibiting 
private fisheries on natural watercourses, is 
inconsistent with a landowner's right to exclude 
sportsmen from his property pursuant to § 23-20-14. 
J.J.N.P. asserts that § 23-15-10!s purpose is to 
provide the public with fishing areas and, because 
private landowners may restrict public access to 
natural waters, that purpose is unachievable in the 
instant case. That conclusion does not follow. The 
right to use public waters for pleasure purposes is no 
less a right just because some landowners, for reasons 
sufficient to themselves, prohibit public access over 
their land to reach those public waters.— Clearly, 
J.J.N.P. *1139 could prohibit all overland access to 
Lake Canyon Lake, However, access to bodies or 
streams of water is not necessary to the securing of 
certain legitimate state interests, such as the 
protection, of wildlife. Furthermore, remote bodies 
of water are now accessible by air. 
FN6. As to wneine s an 
easement in the beds ikes, 
we express no opinion ules 
compare Southern Idaho i^n una dame 
Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock. Inc., 96 Idaho 
360. 528 P.2d 1295 (19741. with Day v. 
Armstrong. Wvo.. 362 P.2d 137 (19611 
The contention that the State wrongfully denied 
J.J.NJVs application for a permit is not supportable. 
I'll THF niH'l IM "UH 
[181 The trial court concluded that the dirt road 
through Lake Canyon was a public road. J.J.N.P. 
does not challenge the correctness of that conclusion, 
but rather contends that the trial court should not 
have decided the issue since it was not raised on the 
pleadings. Although the issue was not properly 
pleaded, the record plainly indicates that both parties 
litigated the issue of the road. "When issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in 
all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings.... [F]allure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues." Rule 15(b), 
U.R.Civ.P. Treating actually litigated issues as if 
they had been properly pleaded serves the ends of 
:
-- ice, whether the pleadings are actually amended 
•ot. First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial 
ih, 597 P.2d 859 (1979). Since the issue 
wa& mud by mutual consent, there was no error in 
deciding the issue. 
A HW> .*-*-. 
S, and HOWL, J! and T TT VRLAN BI JRNS, 
Kidge. concur. 
1, J,, does not participate herein; BURNS, 
a Judge, Nat 
hief Just; i : 
Aty jpin;v« *«*«, w jwincdte a legitimate 
state purpose for distinguishing natural lakes and 
streams from manmade watercourses and, indeed, it 
appears that there is none, 
Vo.\woversy in this ca^ ai.;>. -M^ r^uitiff 
!'" Med not to continue the lease to the Stan by 
• its predecessors in interest granted access to 
, . j.ablic across their land during the winter months 
for ice fishing. Since the public no longer had any 
access to the lake, the Division refused to stock the 
water with fish. Plaintiff then undertook to stock the 
lake, and applied to the Division for permission to do 
so. But because the lake is natural, only the Division 
has the right to stock the waters with fish. Pursuant 
to the provisions of U.C.A.. 1953, 23-15-10., by 
prohibiting a private installation, the State has 
reserved to itself the exclusive right to engage in the 
fish hatchery business. • 
I am unable to determine that the statute promotes 
any public purpose. As acknowledged by Mr. 
Andriano in his testimony before the court, the sole 
reason for the statutory enactment was to afford the 
public a right to fish the natural lakes of this state. 
Notwithstanding the worthiness of that purpose, 
application of the statute in the instant case does not 
provide the public with a fishing site that v* ould 
otherwise be unavailable. The public has a right to 
r-h 'hese wMtcis. but the right is not absolute. The 
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public must first gain lawful access to the waters 
without trespassing upon the land in private 
ownership. 
Plaintiff has asserted its common law right to keep its 
private property private, which it has every right to 
do. The right to private property is one of our oldest 
and most cherished rights, and is protected against 
unauthorized invasion by the State by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and by Article 
I, Section 22, Constitution of Utah. But how does 
releasing fish into the waters by someone other than 
the State violate the public's interests in the water? 
The majority opinion's assertion that raising fish in 
the lake somehow *1140 converts the public waters 
to private waters seems to me a nonsequitur^ 
FN1. It might be asserted that such fish 
would continue to be the private property of 
plaintiff so that the public could not take the 
fish from the lake even if lawful access to 
the waters was gained. But see U.C.A.. 
1953, 23-13-8. where it is provided that 
wildlife which escapes from a private 
wildlife farm becomes the property of the 
State. Though we do not have a similar 
statute with respect to fish, reason would 
dictate that if plaintiff voluntarily releases 
fish into public waters it relinquishes control 
over its private property and the fish may 
thereafter be caught and taken by any 
member of the public. 
There is no issue here concerning the possibility of 
polluting the public waters or of the introduction of 
trash fish into the waters. The Division has power to 
regulate all private fish installations under the statute 
and plaintiff does not contend that it would escape 
regulation because of its ownership of the land 
surrounding the lake. 
The majority opinion initially acknowledges that the 
waters in question are the property of the public but 
thereafter erroneously asserts that the State is the 
owner of the waters and as owner the State has the 
right to prevent private citizens from using the public 
waters for private uses. The State is not the owner of 
public waters; the ownership is in the public itself. 
As members of the public, the owners of plaintiff 
corporation cannot be deprived of making use of the 
public waters, as long as such use does not interfere 
with prior rights to use such water. 
I am of the view that the statute fails as it does not 
promote any legitimate state purpose, and I would 
therefore reverse the district court's judgment. 
Utah,1982. 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, By and Through Div. of 
Wildlife Resources 
655 P.2d 1133 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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R. K. Stewart, Dee G. Johnson, Charles E. Piersall, 
C. K. 'Buddy' Faught, Dr. Will Schunk, William C. 
Jensen, Carroll Noble, John C. Borzea, Verg Teeters, 
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William C. Jensen, Carroll Noble, John C. Borzea, 
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v. 
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and 




Action for declaratory judgment respecting rights of 
plaintiff and those of public to go upon specified 
river channel as it flows across the defendants' lands. 
The District Court, Carbon County, Glen G. Stanton, 
J., entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the 
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Harnsberger, J., held that the public had a right to 
float upon stream regardless of whether it was 
navigable or nonnavigable and statute attempting to 
regulate streams upon which public might float was 
unconstitutional because of its vagueness and its 
attempt to punish things not made criminal. 
Reversed in part and remanded with directions. 
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118Akl24 Statutes Relating to Particular 
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Cases 
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Where plaintiff not only claimed right to float on 
river passing through defendants' land but was 
prevented from doing so by acts of defendants, a real 
justiciable issue arose as to validity of statute 
attempting to regulate streams upon which public 
might float craft. W.S.1957, §§ 41-527,41-528. 
*138 Bard Ferrall and John F. Lynch of Greenwood, 
Ferrall, Bloomfield, Osborn & Lynch, Cheyenne, for 
Kenneth Day and John Rouse. 
Norman B. Gray, Atty. Gen., and George J. Argeris, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., appearing amicus curiae. 
Byron Hirst, Cheyenne, for R. K. Stewart and others. 
J. Reuel Armstrong, Rawlins, pro se. 
Before BLUME, C. J., and PARKER, 
HARNSBERGER, and McINTYRE, JJ. 
Mr. Justice HARNSBERGER delivered the opinion 
of the court. 
Plaintiff in March, 1958, sought judgment declaring 
his rights and those of the *139 public, under 
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the 
State Constitution, the laws of Wyoming, and judicial 
decisions, to go upon the channel, between its high 
water marks, and to float upon the waters of the 
North Platte River where it flows upon and across 
defendants' lands. 
Defendants denied plaintiffs and the public's right to 
either use the channel or to float upon the waters of 
the river as they crossed their lands, but joined in 
asking a declaratory judgment. 
The State of Wyoming by its Attorney General was 
allowed to appear as amicus curiae. 
Other parties permitted to intervene likewise asked 
for declaratory judgment, but claimed for the public 
only the right to float upon or within the waters of the 
river as it flowed upon and across the lands of the 
defendants. 
During the course of the action, the Thirty-Fifth State 
Legislature enacted Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, 
§ § 41-527, 41-528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), the first 
section of which provides as follows: 
'§ § 41-527. Floating persons and property by boat, 
canoe or raft on streams.-Persons and their property 
may only float by boat, canoe or raft for any lawful 
purpose down that part of any stream in the State of 
Wyoming where the records of the state engineer for 
the ten years preceding such floating show that part 
of the stream to have had an average flow of water 
for the month of July exceeding 1,000 cubic feet per 
second, and it shall be unlawful to obstruct or prevent 
such use of such stream, except only so far as may be 
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necessary for the protection of installations now 
existing or hereinafter ordered constructed by 
authority of the state board of control in furtherance 
of the beneficial uses of water; and providing further, 
that nothing herein shall be construed as preventing 
such fencing by those invested with property rights 
and the enjoyment thereof as shall not interfere with 
such floating. It shall be unlawful for any person 
floating any stream to go upon, shoot over or into, 
except with the permission of the owner of such 
property, or damage or litter property on either side 
of the waters of such stream. In enforcing this act [§ 
§ 41-527, 41-528], the records of the state engineer 
shall be conclusive in any trial in any court of the 
State of Wyoming in determining the flow of any 
stream. (Laws 1959, ch. 205, § 1.)' 
After the passage of this legislation, the intervening 
parties filed their motion for summary judgment. 
This was denied by the court which granted the 
intervenors an exception. Thereafter the matter being 
submitted on stipulation of facts and arguments as to 
applicable law, the court found there was a justiciable 
controversy and a class action for a declaratory 
determination of the legal rights, duties and 
obligations of the parties; found generally for the 
plaintiff and intervenors and against the defendants; 
then declared: 
'* * * that the Plaintiff, and all others similarly 
situated as a class and the Intervenors, have the 
public rights and privilege of using the bed, channel 
and water of the North Platte River as it flows 
through the lands of the Defendants for the following 
purposes, and that the Defendants shall not fence or 
use said bed and channel, or any part thereof, so as to 
interfere with any of the following public purposes 
to-wit: 
'(a) The right to fish from a boat, or while wading or 
walking, so long as those exercising the right stay in 
and upon the river bed or well-defined channel, and 
have the proper license and permission of the State of 
Wyoming; 
'(b) The right to walk for any lawful purpose in and 
upon said channel or bed; 
'(c) The right to boat and float on the water in and 
upon said channel; 
*140 '(d) The right to hunt in and upon said bed and 
channel when hunting is permitted by the State and 
within the licensed authority give by the State. 
'It is, further ordered that said public rights of the 
Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, shall not 
embrace the right to camp within and upon said bed 
and channel or use the same for recreation other than 
enumerated above. 
'It is, further, ordered, adjudged and decreed that any 
part or parts of Chapter 205 of the Session Laws of 
Wyoming, 1959, which limit or prohibit the exercise 
by the Plaintiff of the rights above mentioned is 
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and of no effect 
upon the public rights enumerated herein.' 
From this judgment the intervenors appeal 'because 
Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, is constitutional 
and determines the rights of the parties,5 and because 
the order denying intervenors1 motion for summary 
judgment was erroneous. The defendants also 
appeal, but from the whole of the judgment, and they 
designate the complete record and all the proceedings 
and evidence in the action for inclusion in the record 
on appeal. This embodies the pleadings of the 
parties, stipulations, the unchallenged representations 
of the intervenors1 brief in support of their motion for 
summary judgment, uncontradicted affidavits 
submitted in connection therewith, and a brief filed 
by Wyoming Wool Growers Association and 
Wyoming Stock Growers Association as friends of 
the court. 
The admitted facts as exhibited by the complaint are: 
Defendants own land through which the North Platte 
River flows; at intermittent periods the river can float 
canoes, rowboats, outboard motors and other floating 
craft capable of carrying as many as six people; in the 
month of August and until spring run-off, craft 
carrying people and drawing more than one foot of 
water cannot be floated, with minor exceptions, i. e., 
short stretches or reservoirs; craft drawing less than 
one foot of water can be floated carrying people until 
about the middle of October when freezing occurs; 
from early days until 1940, the river was used 
commercially for floating logs, ties and timber; 
plaintiff can enter the river by boat from lands of a 
national forest, by boat or wading, or from a point 
where the county road right of way crosses the 
channel, or by boat or wading from lands of other 
private owners, and the channel may sometimes be 
entered between high water marks by walking. 
Plaintiff, for himself and the public, claims the right 
to use the bed and channel of the river and its waters 
to fish under license of the State, either from a boat 
floating upon the river waters, or while wading the 
waters, or walking within the well-defined channel of 
the stream; to walk in and upon the river's channel; to 
boat and float upon the waters of the river; to hunt 
under State license in and upon the channel of the 
river; and to camp within and upon the channel of the 
river and use it for recreation. Plaintiff also claims 
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neither of the defendants owns the bed of the river, 
but if they do hold title to the channel, that title is 
subject to the paramount right of the public to use the 
channel for the enumerated purposes, and defendants 
may not be legally fence the channel or otherwise 
obstruct it so as to prevent such uses by the public; 
that the water of the river is the property of the State 
and that the State has the duty to equally guard all 
interests in the use of the water as provided by Art. 1, 
§ 31, and Art. 8, § 1, Constitution of Wyoming; that 
by virtue of the State's ownership of the water, 
plaintiff and others similarly situated have the right to 
use the water and the bed of the river for the public 
purposes enumerated; that defendants denied plaintiff 
and all other persons the right to use the bed or 
channel of the river; that defendants fenced the same 
and claimed they could expel and remove by force, if 
necessary, the plaintiff and others who attempted to 
use the bed and channel of the river without first 
obtaining defendants' consent; that defendants did not 
permit plaintiff to exercise his claimed *141 rights 
and will not permit plaintiffs exercise of the same 
unless restrained; that the question presented is one 
of great public interest and as such should be 
determined as provided by Ch. 3, Art. 58, 
W.C.S.1945 (now § § 1-1049 to 1-1064, W.S.1957, 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act); and that the 
Attorney General should intervene. 
The defendants' answer in substance denies the river 
is navigable in fact, although defendants admit that 
certain small craft have floated and do float upon it, 
and denies the plaintiff has any of the rights or 
privileges alleged in the complaint. 
Defendants allege that the use of small boats during 
part of the year upon the river does not constitute 
navigation of the river, nor does the floating of logs, 
ties and timber establish the river as being navigable; 
that they have the right to fence the river channel 
upon their own land and have the right to use the 
channel in their own business; that they have the right 
to deny plaintiff and others all uses, privileges and 
rights claimed by the plaintiff; and that they will not 
permit fishing, camping, boating, or other similar use 
of the river channel within their lands, nor will they 
permit the use of the surface of the river's water as it 
passes through and across their land except with their 
permission. 
Defendants further allege they hold the fee title to 
their respective lands and that neither of them can 
profitably operate his ranch if plaintiff prevails; that 
other landowners upon rivers, lakes and reservoirs 
will be vitally affected by the outcome of the action; 
and that they have always assumed and believed their 
properties were free from trespass by others. 
The plaintiff and defendants stipulated that the 
complaint accurately and completely states the 
material facts; that the conclusions of law therein are 
not admitted; and that those conclusions of law 
constitute the issues in the case. 
The intervenors' answer alleges that from time 
immemorial the waters of the North Platte River have 
been used continuously for transportation by shallow 
draft craft and of logs, etc.; that in 1869 the river was 
declared by law to be a public highway (repealed 
however by Ch. 42, Laws of Wyoming, 1901); that 
the water is now State property; that during the 
winter the river is dangerous to livestock because of 
freezing and thaw, and in the spring the river is 
dangerous to livestock because of floating trees, logs, 
etc.; that many ranchers fence along the river 
margins; that from early summer to about September 
1, the water volume permits boating, but after 
September 1, the water diminishes, boating is not 
feasible, and cattle may venture into the river with 
safety; that some ranchers fence across the river to 
prevent cattle straying, but some fences are destroyed 
in the winter by ice and are washed out in the spring 
by high water; that one defendant in 1957 erected a 
barrier across the river not connected with any fence 
controlling livestock, and declared he intended to 
prevent use of the river by boats and fishermen; that 
this barrier was destroyed and washed out; that this 
action was brought by plaintiff with the advice, 
consent, counsel and collaboration of defendants; that 
intervenors contend only that they and the public are 
entitled to continue to float on waters of the river 
without hindrance and to catch fish owned by the 
State, having due regard and respect for the rights of 
adjacent landowners. The intervenors then describe 
their personal and business activities and the interests 
they represent, claiming that the action between 
plaintiff and defendants presents fictitious issues and 
misrepresents real issues between fishermen and 
ranchers on the river; allege the title of defendants to 
the lands involved is subject to reservations and 
restrictions of record, and as provided by the laws of 
the State and of the United States; that both the 
waters of the river and the fish in those waters belong 
to the State; that the public has the right to the use of 
the waters for boat fishing; and that it is the duty of 
the State to equally guard all the various interests of 
the public in those waters. Attached to the 
intervenors' motion for summary judgment *142 
were a number of affidavits which we deem to have 
no material significance, with the exception of that of 
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the State Engineer certifying that the average flow of 
water for the month of July for the preceding ten 
years at Saratoga, Wyoming, gauging station on the 
North Platte River was 1,308 cubic feet per second, 
and other affidavits stating that the river flow at the 
point certified by the State Engineer was substantially 
the same flow as that of the river where it crossed the 
defendants' lands. 
It is our understanding that a fair summary of the 
respective position of the parties is as follows: The 
plaintiff insists the river is navigable because it will 
float craft, and, therefore, the bed of the river is 
public property and can be used by the public 
between its high water marks for any purpose of 
which it is susceptible. The Attorney General denies 
the river is navigable, but asserts it may be used for 
floating of certain craft and for fishing and other 
lawful purposes. Defendants contend no one except 
themselves has any rights in the river as it passes 
through their properties. The intervenors claim for 
themselves and the public only the right to float upon 
and fish within the river. The wool growers and 
stock growers maintain no one has a right on streams 
which pass through properties in private ownership 
except the proprietors of the land. 
There are certain sections of the State and Federal 
Constitutions which counsel deem have bearing upon 
the various questions involved here, as well as a host 
of Wyoming statutory provisions. Those having 
important significance are § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution relating to 
due process and equal protection of law, and the 
following sections of the Constitution of Wyoming: 
Art. 1, § 6, relating to due process of law; Art. 1, § 
7, denying there is absolute arbitrary power over 
property; Art. 1, § 10, right of accused to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation; Art. 1, § 31, 
giving the State the control of waters and requiring it 
to equally guard all various interests involved; Art. 1, 
§ 34, requiring all laws of a general nature to have 
uniform operation; Art. 3, § 27, prohibiting certain 
special laws; Art. 8, § 1, declaring the State's 
ownership of all waters within its boundaries; and 
Art. 13, § 1, relating to municipal corporation 
classification. Applicable statutes will be referred to 
as may be necessary. 
The criticized judgment being declaratory of the law 
under a particular set of circumstances, the court was 
entitled to and undoubtedly did consider every factual 
matter which was submitted. This included not only 
matter contained in the pleadings, but also that 
exhibited by affidavits and stipulation, even though 
not expressly admitted or joined in by all parties. 
This is because such additional facts were not 
challenged or contradicted, and, hence, no genuine 
issue of fact was presented which required resolution. 
[1] The 'Brief Amicus Curiae of Wyoming Wool 
Growers Association and Wyoming Stock Growers 
Association' advises the court that the members of 
those organizations have always contended the owner 
of lands through which flows a stream nonnavigable 
in the Federal sense may deny fishermen, hunters, 
wanderers, and campers the right to use his property, 
and although the Constitution declares all water is the 
property of the State, that provision is limited to right 
of appropriation for irrigation and other beneficial 
uses; that while the Legislature has provided for 
appropriation for water for those purposes, it has not 
declared streams stocked with fish to be 'public ways' 
nor regulated that type of use and such legislation is a 
condition precedent to the claimed use of waters. 
Aside from the fact that at the time this argument was 
advanced, Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, § § 41-
527,41-528, W.S.1957, was enacted and purported to 
declare the State's waters might be used for floating 
transportation, as early as 1909, the Legislature 
enacted Ch. 68, § 2, S.L. of Wyoming, 1909 
(substantially the same as § 41-3, W.S. 1957), which 
gives recognition that transportation is a use to which 
waters may be put in the language following: 
*143 'Water rights are hereby defined as follows 
according to use: Preferred uses shall include rights 
for domestic and transportation purposes * * *.' 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Additionally, Ch. 89, Laws of Wyoming, 1901, and 
Ch. 16, S.L. of Wyoming, 1903, now § 41-224, 
W.S. 1957, regulated the driving or floating of logs, 
timber or lumber down or upon any stream in the 
State, without reference to its being navigable or 
nonnavigable. These statutes indicate the Legislature 
was aware that, without regard to their being 
navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any 
other concept of navigability, its waters were usable 
for purposes other than irrigation, consumption, 
power or mining, and the waters might be used for 
transportation by flotation. So it would seem that 
subject to whatever statutory limitations may be 
imposed by the State on such use, or by the Federal 
government when interstate or international rights are 
involved, the actual usability of the waters is alone 
the limit of the public's right to so employ them. 
[2] Nothing is found in either our State Constitution, 
the Act of Congress admitting the State to the Union, 
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or any subsequent act of Congress, which limits the 
kind or type of use the State may make of its waters. 
[3] We understand that 'navigability in the Federal 
sense' means the capability or susceptibility of 
waters, in their natural condition, of being used for 
navigation in interstate or international commerce, 
and navigability in any other sense may mean any 
one of a variety of definitions given navigability by 
either of the several states of the Union. 
[4] There is an element of paramount control by the 
Federal government with respect to navigable waters, 
but that superior right exists only where navigable 
waters may be used in either interstate or 
international commerce. This was made clear in City 
of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 357 U.S. 320. 
334. 78 S.Ct. 1209. 1217. 2 L.Ed.2d 1345. 1353. the 
court saying: 
'It is no longer open to question that the Federal 
Government under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) has dominion, to the 
exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the 
United States. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.) 
See also 65 CJ.S. Navigable Waters § 10a, pp. 61, 
62, and cases cited. 
[5] However, except when so used or available for 
use in interstate or international commerce, the 
exclusive control of waters is vested in the state, 
whether the waters are deemed navigable in the 
Federal sense or in any other sense. See 65 CJ.S. 
Navigable Waters § 10b, pp. 63-65. It follows the 
state may lay down and follow such criteria for 
cataloging waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it 
sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership 
of submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or 
nonnavigable character of waters above them. See 
Donnelly v. United States. 228 U.S. 243. 33 S.Ct. 
449. 57 L.Ed. 820. Ann.Cas.l913E. 710. rehearing 
denied 228 U.S. 708. 33 S.Ct. 1024. 57 L.Ed. 1035. 
All of counsel have dealt extensively with the 
question of navigability or nonnavigability of the 
river and rights incident thereto as it passes through 
or across defendants' lands. We have carefully 
examined the great volume of authorities referred to 
or cited by counsel and have found them to be very 
instructive. However, in the view we take, it would 
serve no purpose to make exhaustive reference to or 
give extensive quotations from them, as this would 
only serve to exhibit the differences between Federal 
views on what constitutes navigability and the 
varieties of views on the subject entertained by the 
courts of different states. Furthermore, any attempt to 
improve upon or further elaborate the question would 
probably not be fruitful. 
Although we are not prepared to say the criteria used 
by courts of different states and of the United States 
to determine navigability of waters and ownership of 
and beneath them were either unwise or unsound*144 
when used to meet the special circumstances 
presented in their respective jurisdictions, if we are to 
observe the existing constitutional and statutory law 
of this State, the great majority of those decisions are 
of limited helpfulness. The mere capability of a 
stream to float a single commercial crosstie, which 
has been used at times as a somewhat extreme test 
determining navigability and consequent ownership 
of land underlying the water, does not solve the 
question of whether waters in this State, which are 
capable of being occasionally used to float acceptable 
craft, may be so used even if they are considered as 
being nonnavigable and are upon, pass or flow over 
and across lands claimed in private ownership. 
The basic reason for using navigability as a 
classification was to designate certain waters as 
public and others as private, and to give to public 
authority, not only ownership and control of 
navigable waters, but also ownership and control of 
their beds and channels while leaving in private 
ownership and control the beds and channels of 
nonnavigable waters. In the instant case, however, 
this test is rendered unnecessary to establish the 
ownership of the waters, because by our Constitution 
and its Congressional approval, the title of all waters 
of the State is placed in public ownership. This 
makes apropos the statement in Ne-Bo-Shone Ass!n 
v. Hogarth. D.C. Mich.. 7 F.SUPD. 885. 889. affirmed 
6Cir..81F.2d70: 
'Because some waters are public, certain rights attach 
thereto. These rights are not limited by the test by 
which the nature of the waters is determined but to 
the rights incident to the characterization as public of 
the stream or body of water.' 
[6] [7] Public ownership of the bed and channel of 
navigable streams, as well as control of their waters, 
seems to have been considered necessary in order to 
forestall interference with the commercial navigation 
of which they were capable. However, riparian 
ownership to the center of nonnavigable streams need 
not necessarily materially interfere with and does not 
necessarily prevent the State's use of waters for 
purposes for which they are adaptable and to which 
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they may be put for the equal benefit of all members 
of the public. Irrespective of the ownership of the 
bed of a stream or of land upon which there are 
waters or over which waters flow, the State's right to 
control and use its own waters as it sees fit is 
paramount, except as it may be shown the title of the 
Federal government to such waters was incumbered 
when that title passed from the Federal government 
to the State upon its admission to the Union. Thus 
the right of every person over or through whose lands 
the waters belonging to the State are found or flow, 
and whose title to waters does not antecede that of 
the State, is subject to the State's right to use and 
control its waters as it sees fit. The test of 
navigability does not determine other uses to which 
the State may put its waters even though navigability 
would determine the title to the land underlying them. 
In a late Ohio case (1959), Mentor Harbor Yachting 
Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193. 163 
N.E.2d 373. 375. it was said: 
'The division of watercourses into navigable and 
nonnavigable is merely a method of dividing them 
into public and private, which is the more natural 
classification. * * *' 
But such a division or classification of watercourses, 
while determining title to lands beneath navigable 
waters, does not necessarily limit, destroy or curtail 
the public's right to use nonnavigable waters nor 
prevent the public's floating in or upon those waters 
and fishing for fish planted and propagated therein by 
the State, so long as such uses do not unnecessarily 
trespass upon lands or properties which are in private 
ownership and so long as the State does not curtail 
such uses. Navigability is not the only touchstone by 
which waters become public. The public may receive 
title to them by grant and in the manner Wyoming 
became possessed of all waters within the State. 
*145 Article 8, § 1, of our Wyoming Constitution 
declares the waters of all natural streams, springs, 
lakes, or other collections of still water, within the 
boundaries of the State, are the property of the State. 
By its Act of Admission, approved July 10, 1890, 26 
Stat. 222, ratifying our State Constitution, Congress 
gave express approval to that declaration regarding 
the State's ownership of waters. Merrill v. Bishop. 69 
Wvo. 45. 237 P.2d 186: Id.. 74 Wvo. 298. 310. 311. 
287 P.2d 620. 624: Mitchell Irr. Dist. v. Sharp. 10 
Cir.. 121 F.2d964. 967. This court has interpreted the 
State's title to the waters to be one of trust for the 
benefit of the people. Farm Investment Co. v. 
Carpenter. 9 Wvo. 110. 61 P. 258. 50 L.R.A. 747. 87 
Am.St.Rep. 918: Willev v. Decker. 11 Wvo. 496. 73 
P. 210. 100 Am.St.Rep. 939: Merrill v. Bishop, 
supra; Lake De Smet Reservoir Co. v. Kanfmann, 75 
Wvo. 87. 292 P.2d 482. See also Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n 
v. Hogarth. D.C.Mich.. 7 F.Supp. 885. affirmed 6 
Cir..81F.2d70. 
All parties seem to recognize that if a river is 
nonnavigable the bed and channel of the stream 
belong to the riparian owner. No one seriously 
disputes that the waters themselves belong to the 
State and are held in trust by it for the benefit of the 
public. So if the river is nonnavigable we would 
have a clear case of divided ownership of the river as 
an entity, because title to the bed and channel would 
be in the riparian owner and title to the waters is in 
the State. Whether this be considered as a conflict of 
interest or an overlapping of ownerships is of no 
particular importance. At all events, it would be 
desirable that each owner be accorded maximum 
incidents of ownership with minimum obligation 
upon the other. 
The navigable or nonnavigable classification of 
waters does not affect the State's ownership of its 
waters nor lessen any use to which they may be put 
by the public, so long, in the case of waters navigable 
in interstate or international commerce, as that use 
leaves their flow or presence unimpaired and so long, 
in the case of nonnavigable waters, as such use is not 
prohibited by the State. There seems to be no 
considerable difference between dividing the 
ownership and use of lands beneath waters from the 
ownership and use of waters upon or flowing over or 
across that land than there is in the horizontal 
division in land ownership such as not infrequently 
occurs in ownership of surface and subsurface areas. 
Even where land is divided vertically there are 
certain obligations or duties placed upon each owner 
in order to enable the other to make use of and enjoy 
that which is his. So it is that while the right of 
ingress and egress upon and over the surface 
accompanies subsurface ownership where there is a 
horizontal division, there also is a similar right of 
ingress and egress across adjacent lands where no 
other access is available, as well as a restrainable 
right of nuisance use of adjacent lands. Also, it may 
be that a full use of lands underlying waters may 
entitle their owner to some type of reasonable 
easement in the State's waters. In each instance the 
enjoyment of rights incident to separate ownership 
may require easement in the property of another. 
|"81[9][10] The title to waters within this State being 
in the State, in concomitance, it follows that there 
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must be an easement in behalf of the State for a right 
of way through their natural channels for such waters 
upon and over lands submerged by them or across the 
bed and channels of streams or other collections of 
waters. Callahan v. Price, 26 Idaho 745. 146 P. 732: 
Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561. 95 P. 499. 24 
L.R.A.,N.S.. 1240; Nelson v. Robinson. 47 
Cal.App.2d 520. 118 P.2d 350: Id.. 73 Cal.App.2d 
263. 166 P.2d 76: Scott v. Lattig. 227 U.S. 229. 33 
S.Ct. 242. 57 L.Ed. 490. 44 L.R.A..N.S.. 107; Smith 
v. Long. 76 Idaho 265. 281 P.2d 483: 65 C.J.S. 
Navigable Waters § 93b(l), pp. 205, 206. The 
waters not being in trespass upon or over the lands 
where they naturally appear, they are available for 
such uses by the public of which they are capable. 
When waters are able to float craft, they may be so 
used. When so floating craft, as a necessary incident 
to that use, the bed *146 or channel of the waters 
may be unavoidably scraped or touched by the 
grounding of craft. Even a right to disembark and 
pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles and rapids 
accompanies this right of flotation as a necessary 
incident to the full enjoyment of the public's 
easement. As early as 1874, Michigan courts 
recognized that where a river was capable of floating 
logs, that right of flotage was but a right of passage, 
including only such rights as are incident to that right 
and necessary to render it reasonably available. See 
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis. 30 Mich. 308. 
319. In 1909. Missouri, in McKinnev v. Northcutt. 
114 Mo.App. 146. 89 S.W. 351. 355. did likewise 
and later in Elder v. Delcour. 241 Mo.App. 839. 263 
S.W.2d221. reversed 364 Mo. 835. 269 S.W.2d 17. 
47 A.L.R.2d 370. reaffirmed that principle. On the 
other hand, where the use of the bed or channel is 
more than incidental to the right of floating use of the 
waters, and the primary use is of the bed or channel 
rather than the floating use of the waters, such 
wading or walking is a trespass upon lands belonging 
to a riparian owner and is unlawful. Such trespass 
cannot be made lawful either by legislative or judicial 
action. Thus the use of waters for the floating of 
which they are capable and uses incidental thereto, as 
distinguished from unlicensed use of the land beneath 
them, is within the public's right unless made 
unlawful by statute. Except as herein specified, to 
use the bed or channel of the river to wade or walk 
the stream remains an unlawful trespass. This 
disagrees somewhat with Munninghoff v. Wisconsin 
Conservation Commission. 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 
712: Elder v. Delcour, supra; and perhaps with some 
other authorities. 
Notwithstanding that the Elder-Delcour case was 
decided with reference to what was said to be its own 
peculiar facts, those facts are so closely paralleled in 
the matter before us as to make them quite helpful 
here. There the river in question was held to be 
nonnavigable, notwithstanding it could be floated by 
canoes, rowboats and other small craft, and in the 
past had been used for floating and transporting logs 
and timber. The stream was well stocked with fish 
and was heavily fished by sportsmen, both by wading 
and floating and from the banks. Also access to the 
river could be gained from a public road and at points 
where it crossed privately owned lands. It was 
claimed the public had the right not only to float by 
craft upon the waters of the river and to leave the 
river and carry or drag around obstructions, but also 
the right to wade the river and use its banks for 
camping and recreation. 
Under our conception of the law, if we hold the river 
in question here is nonnavigable, then title to the bed 
or channel of the stream will be in the riparian owner. 
By Constitutional edict, title to all waters is in the 
State. Under such circumstances the use of waters 
for floating, with incidental use of their beds and 
channels, cannot be interfered with or obstructed by 
the riparian owner. However, in using the State's 
waters for floating, the public is not privileged, 
except as incidental to such use, to violate other 
property rights of riparian owners. Where such 
divided ownership occurs, 'the landowner and the 
public have certain reciprocal rights, which may be 
enjoyed without the destruction of the other.' 
Charnley v. Shawano Water Power & River 
Improvement Co.. 109 Wis. 563. 569. 85 N.W. 507. 
509. 53 L.R.A. 895. We are not inclined to go as far 
as the Missouri court when it permitted wading or 
walking upon the bed or channel of the river or use of 
its banks for recreation. Perhaps the reason for our 
difference with the Missouri court is seated in the fact 
that our conclusions are based solely upon 
Wyoming's Constitutional declaration that all waters 
within its boundaries belong to the State, while the 
court in Missouri, which state does not have such an 
express constitutional declaration as ours, may have 
been largely influenced by other considerations. 
[11][12] Streams in their natural state, such as that 
described by the factual matter appearing in the 
record before us, although capable of intermittent 
floating of craft for recreational use and for small 
*147 commercial use in the floating of ties, logs, and 
timber, are nevertheless unsuited for navigation in 
interstate or international commerce and are not of 
such economic value for transportation as justifies 
their being classified as navigable waters, thereby 
taking from riparian proprietors the title and 
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ownership of the bed and channel of the river where 
it flows by, through, over, across, or upon their lands. 
So we must hold the portion of the river here in 
question is nonnavigable and that its bed and channel 
are the property of the riparian owner. This 
conclusion is fortified by the fact that the use to 
which the waters of the river have been put in the 
past to seasonably float logs and timber and certain 
small craft by which various activities, such as 
fishing, hunting, pleasure, etc., may be continued by 
the public's using only the waters of the stream 
themselves and without any but minor and incidental 
use of the lands beneath them. 
[13] Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or 
channel of waters, and irrespective of their 
navigability, the public has the right to use public 
waters of this State for floating usable craft and that 
use may not be interfered with or curtailed by any 
landowner. It is also the right of the public while so 
lawfully floating in the State's waters to lawfully hunt 
or fish or do any and all other things which are not 
otherwise made unlawful. See Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v. 
Hogarth. D.C.Mich.. 7 F.Supp. 885, affirmed 6 Cir.. 
81F.2d70. 
Although Ch. 205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, now § § 
41-527,41-528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), was enacted 
after the commencement of this litigation, a mere 
declaration of the law's application respecting the 
relative rights of the public and riparian owners of the 
river, before it became effective, would be valueless 
if the Act in any way affected those relative rights. 
We should, therefore, examine the new law, first, to 
determine its constitutionality, and if found not to 
transcend constitutional law, then to ascertain what, if 
any, change it makes in the rights involved. 
Plaintiff-appellee suggests the 'floating' is used as an 
opposite to wading or walking. We, therefore, 
assume he concluded the Act does not affect any 
rights of those who wade or walk the river, because 
the Act is silent respecting them. With this 
conclusion we can agree without conceding the right 
to wade or walk exists. 
In condemning the Act as void for ambiguity, lack of 
uniformity and vagueness, this appellee cites In re 
Newbern. 53 Cal.2d 786. 3 Cal.Rptr. 364. 350 P.2d 
116.120.121.123. as follows: 
The requirement of a reasonable degree of certainty 
in legislation, especially in the criminal law, is a well 
established element of the guarantee of due process 
of law. 'No one may be required at peril of life, 
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to 
what the State commands or forbids. * * * 'a statute 
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application violates the first essential of due 
process of law." Lanzetta v. [State of] New Jersey. 
306 U.S. 451. 453. 59 S.Ct. 618. 83 L.Ed. 888: see 
also Connallv v. General Const. Co.. 269 U.S. 385. 
391. 46 S.Ct. 126. 70 L.Ed. 322. Such also is the law 
of the State of California. People v. McCaughan. 49 
Cal.2d 409.414. 317 P.2d 974.' 
The court continued 350 P.2d at page 123: 
'* * * The first aspect of the difficulty is that citizens 
are not sufficiently warned by vague language as to 
what course of conduct is denounced. Secondly, the 
court is given insufficient standards by which to 
judge the defendant's conduct. Consequently, each 
judge and jury is free to define the crime in any 
manner that it sees fit, giving rise to the dangers of 
imposing ex post facto punishment on the defendant, 
having the jury find the *148 law as well as the facts 
and giving the statute the effect of a bill of attainder 
in each particular case. 
'Finally, we might point out that the Constitution of 
the State of California commands that all general 
laws be of uniform operation. Const., Art. I, § 11. 
That provision will not tolerate a criminal law so 
lacking in definition that each defendant is left to the 
vagaries of individual judges and juries. * * *' 
Counsel also likens the Newbern holding to what this 
court had to say in Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway 
Department. 76 Wvo. 247. 301 P.2d 818. claiming 
that although a portion of our Driver License Law 
was held unconstitutional for improper delegation of 
legislative power to an administrative office, this 
court indicated that the ambiguity of the statute 
would also render it unconstitutional. 
[14] It seems to us Chapter 205 is fraught with 
indefiniteness, leaving uncertain legislative intent and 
impregnating the Act with ambiguities. 
In substance the Act says persons and property may 
only float by boat, canoe and raft down a stream 
where for ten years preceding the stream had an 
average flow for July exceeding 1,000 cubic feet per 
second. It then makes it unlawful to obstruct or 
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prevent such use except to protect present and future 
authorized installations; provides that those invested 
with property rights may fence, so long as the fencing 
shall not interfere with the prescribed floating; makes 
it unlawful for any person floating to go upon, or 
shoot over or into, or damage or litter the property on 
either side of the water; and provides a fine of $100 
for violation of the Act. 
One meaning which may be given to the word 'only' 
would merely limit the means and methods by which 
persons and property may be floated. Another 
meaning would be that floating downstream was 
permitted while floating upstream was not 
sanctioned. A boat, canoe or raft is floating, whether 
it goes upstream or downstream, even though the 
upstream progress requires use of oars, motors, 
poling, sails, pushing, or other means of propulsion. 
If the Act be considered as prohibiting the floating of 
persons or property in streams of the specified flow 
in any other manner than by boat, canoe or raft, it 
excludes the floating in such streams of any tie, log, 
or other material unless made into some kind of raft, 
yet in streams of less flow, it would leave untouched 
their use for tie, log and timber drives. 
Again the Act might be construed as prohibiting all 
types of floating use in streams unless the stream 
meets the flow specifications prescribed, and, if so, is 
it intended to repeal by implication § 41-224, 
W.S.I957, which provides for floating of certain 
materials without regard to average flow? 
In fact, the Act, as far as flotation goes, does not in 
terms either permit or prohibit anything. If the 
statute is said to grant a permissive right not 
theretofore enjoyed by the public, the word 'only' 
might fairly be construed as a word of limitation 
upon the grant. If, however, it is taken to have the 
connotation of prohibition, it would imply the 
previous existence of a right which was being denied, 
at least in part, by the statute. That which is made 
unlawful is, of course, prohibited by law. The 
proscriptive fencing and going upon, shooting over or 
into property, and the damaging or littering of 
property while floating are made unlawful, and 
consequently, prohibited and properly made subject 
to penalty. But in the balance of the Act, relating to 
floating upon the river, nothing is expressly 
commanded, prohibited or made unlawful. If the Act 
merely limits floating to being exercised in a certain 
way, floating in any other way violates the Act and 
subjects to penalty, even though that is not made 
unlawful. A person charged in the language of the 
statute with violation of that part of the Act would be 
at loss to know exactly with what crime he was being 
charged. Would it be because he had *149 floated in 
some manner other than by boat, canoe or raft; or that 
he had floated up or otherwise than down the river; or 
that he floated in the river when it failed of having 
averaged the prescribed flow of water? 
Whatever view is taken as to the meaning of the word 
'only' in its context, the result must arise solely by 
implication, construction or interpretation. There is 
no plain, clear, unambiguous meaning expressed by it 
which gives that certainty required in criminal 
statutes. Nevertheless, the Act is definitely intended 
as a criminal law for it makes unlawful the 
obstruction of 'such' stream so as to prevent its use, 
except so far as may be necessary to protect existing 
installations and authorized future installations. It 
also makes unlawful certain acts by persons when 
floating any stream. The penalty prescribed by the 
Act is to be inflicted upon all persons who 'violate' 
the Act, whether such violation consists of doing that 
which is made unlawful, or for the doing of a thing 
which may be considered as being impliedly 
prohibited, or for going beyond the permission which 
may be thought to be impliedly granted. 
If the word 'only' is taken as a limitation upon 
floating, the Act is violated and subjects to penalty 
when floating occurs in any other manner even 
though that which is done is neither prohibited nor 
made unlawful. But this statutory definition of the 
limit of a right does not in itself make going beyond 
that limit a crime and subject the offender to criminal 
punishment. Floating in or upon the waters of a 
river, the flow of which does not meet that which is 
specified, is not expressly prohibited or made 
unlawful, nor is floating up the river or merely 
remaining afloat or floating by some other means 
made unlawful or prohibited. So the Act may be 
violated in those respects without committing a crime 
or breaching the law. In Commonwealth v. Galloway. 
203 Kv. 102, 261 S.W. 887. 888. where a statute 
provided that a failure to comply with any of its 
provisions was a misdemeanor, the court held: 
'* * * In a penal statute the mere granting of the 
privilege to do a thing in a particular way may not be 
construed into a prohibition against doing that thing 
in any other way, especially when the whole act 
contemplates the doing of that thing in some way.' 
When our Act says such violation is to be penalized, 
it is clearly unconstitutional, as it assumes to punish 
that which is not prohibited, unlawful or made 
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criminal. This in itself not only makes that portion of 
the Act unconstitutional, but as the statute is penal 
and to be strictly construed, we must hold Ch. 205, 
S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, unconstitutional in toto. 
McFarland v. City of Cheyenne. 48 Wvo. 86. 42 P.2d 
413: Annotation, 104A.L.R. 1095. 
If we had any doubt about the unconstitutionality of 
the 1959 law, it would seem to be resolved by 
pronouncements in State v. A. H. Read Co., 33 Wvo. 
387. 401. 402. 240 P. 208. 212. 213. There it was 
argued that nothing was declared unlawful by the 
statute, and nothing penalized, except a violation of 
the provisions of statute which merely declared a 
legislative limitation of the time of service upon 
public works without expressly commanding or 
prohibiting anything. After pointing out that the 
Federal Supreme Court had held 
'* * * that a penal statute, prescribing no certain 
standard of conduct, violates the fundamental 
principle of justice embodied in the conception of 
due process of law, and is void because violating the 
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States declaring that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, and the provision of the 
Sixth Amendment declaring that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; * 
this court said: 
'* * * And state laws thus uncertain are likewise held 
to be void *150 upon the same principle, as violating 
the due process of law clause and the other related 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
applies to state governments. * * *' 
It then noted that because of the absence from the 
statute of the necessary expressions of command or 
prohibition, a Federal constitutional question was 
presented and our own State constitution provided 
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused had the 
right to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation (Art. 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution), 
this would be denied him in the absence of sufficient 
certainty in the statute under which he was being 
prosecuted, and said at 240 P. 212-213: 
4
* * * no one can be lawfully convicted of a * * * 
misdemeanor, unless the act charged, if not a crime at 
common law, is clearly denounced or penalized as a 
crime by statute. So it is well settled that criminal 
statutes are to be strictly construed, which means that 
they are not to be enlarged by implication or 
extended by inference or construction * * *.' 
Of the rule thus stated, the court further said it 
'* * * requires a sufficient degree of certainty in a 
criminal statute, that will place it outside the 
necessity of judicial determination, through mere 
implication or construction, of who or what acts are 
punishable under it. * * *' 
And the court quoted with approval at 240 P. 213: 
'Thus in U. S. v. Reese. 92 U.S. 214. 23 L.Ed. 563. it 
is said: 
"If the Legislature undertakes to define by statute a 
new offense, and provide for its punishment, it 
should express its will in language that need not 
deceive the common mind. Every man should be 
able to know with certainty when he is committing a 
crime. * * * It would certainly be dangerous if the 
Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and 
who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative 
department of the government." 
The case now before us is thus placed squarely within 
those pronouncements of State v. Read, supra, 
because it would be only by judicial determination 
through implication or construction that other than 
certain types of floating would be prohibited and 
made unlawful so as to subject an accused to the 
penalty provided if such floating occurred. 
The patents from which defendants1 titles are 
deraigned do not exclude or reserve therefrom the 
bed or channel of the river. The most that is claimed 
to be contained in the patents involved is that they 
were granted subject to any vested and accrued water 
rights for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or 
other purposes, and rights to ditches and reservoirs 
used in connection with such water rights. 43 
U.S.C.A. § 661. We do not understand these 
reservations to withdraw from the patent the beds or 
channels of rivers. 
Furthermore numerous decisions support our view 
that the title to the nonnavigable waters belong to the 
riparian owners. 
<* * * Title to the beds of the nonnavigable rivers and 
streams within the state remains in the United States, 
or in those persons who have received title from the 
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United States. * * ** 93 CJ.S. Waters § 71, p. 748. 
See also State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330: 
United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 55 S.Ct. 
610, 79 L.Ed 1267: United States v. State of Utah, 
283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 438, 75 L.Ed. 844: United 
States v. Champlin Refining Co., 10 Cir., 156 F.2d 
769, affirmed 331 U.S. 788, 67 S.Ct. 1346, 91 L.Ed. 
1818, rehearing denied 331 U.S. 869, 67 S.Ct. 1727, 
91 L.Ed. 1872: *151Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. State 
ex rel. Com'rs of Land Office, 200 Okl. 134, 191 
P.2d 224: Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 56 P.2d 
1158: Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 
N.W.2d488. 
The question presented here is not that of creating a 
new public right nor even of giving initial recognition 
to an unused public right. We are dealing with a use 
long enjoyed by the public which is properly theirs, 
but which is now sought to be denied them. 
[15] The interveners' contention that there is no 
justiciable issue and that this is not a class action is 
without merit. The plaintiff not only claimed a right 
and attempted to indulge it, but was prevented from 
doing so by the acts of the defendants. Thereby a 
real justiciable issue arose. It provided a real dispute, 
not a moot one. Under the facts submitted we are 
also convinced the litigation is properly considered as 
a class action affecting the rights of the public 
generally. 
Intervenors1 further complaint that their motion for 
summary judgment was improperly denied, while 
possibly having some merit, is at least subject to 
considerable doubt, especially as it was predicated 
upon a statute which is held to be unconstitutional. 
In any event, the substantial result sought by the 
motion is accomplished by our holdings herein. 
In conclusion, while we recognize the legislative 
right to regulate within constitutional limits the 
floating, as well as other uses of public waters, until 
such time as regulations are promulgated we hold: 
That the portion of the river in dispute is 
nonnavigable; that its riparian owners have title to the 
bed and channel of the river, but that this title is 
subject to an easement for a right of way of the river's 
waters in their natural channel through, over and 
across defendants' lands; that the waters of the river 
are the property of the State and are held by it in trust 
for the equal use and benefit of the public; that the 
waters of the river may be used by the public for 
floating usable craft therein or thereon and for 
transporting in such usable craft persons or property; 
that as an incident to the full enjoyment and use of 
the State's easement for its waters over and across the 
lands held in private ownership, persons so floating 
in usable craft may, when necessary, disembark and 
walk, or wade upon submerged lands in order to pull, 
push, or carry craft over or across shallows, riffles, 
rapids or obstructions; that while so floating in usable 
craft, the public may fish or hunt or do any and all 
other things which are not otherwise made unlawful, 
but that the State is without power to authorize the 
violation of any property rights of riparian or other 
owners except as incident to the full exercise of 
easement to which property may be subject; that the 
waters of the river, if capable thereof, may also be 
used for transporting logs, ties, timber and other 
material when permitted by State law; that riparian 
owners of lands bordering upon or through which the 
river flows may not in any manner obstruct the flow 
of the river's waters so as to interfere with or prevent 
the free passage of any craft used commercially or for 
recreation or for floating ties, logs, or timber; that Ch. 
205, S.L. of Wyoming, 1959, now § § 41-527, 41-
528, W.S.1957 (1959 Supp.), is unconstitutional as 
being vague, uncertain, ambiguous and subjecting to 
its penalty the violation of provisions of the Act 
which are neither made unlawful nor prohibited; and 
that the judgment appealed from must be reversed 
insofar as it permits unrestricted walking or wading 
in or upon the bed or channel of the river and that the 
judgment of the lower court be vacated in this 
respect. 
The judgment is therefore reversed in part, and the 
cause remanded with direction to vacate so much of 
the judgment as is contrary to our holdings herein, 
and to make such further judgment as may be 
necessary to conform with this opinion. 
Reversed in part and remanded with directions. 
Wyo. 1961 
Day v. Armstrong 
362 P.2d 137 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
175P.2d759 Page 1 
111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 
(Cite as: 111 Utah 1,175 P.2d 759) 
MONROE v. STATE Utah 1946 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
MONROE et al. 
v. 
STATE et al. 
No. 6964. 
Dec. 20, 1946. 
Appeal from District Court, Fifth Judicial District, 
Millard County; Will L. Hoyt, Judge. 
Suit by Ralph Monroe and others against the State 
and another to quiet title to the bed of a lake. Decree 
for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
HI Navigable Waters 270 €=>36(1) 
270 Navigable Waters 
270II Lands Under Water 
270k36 Ownership and Control in General 
270k36(l) k. Ownership by State. Most 
Cited Cases 
Waters and Water Courses 405 
405 Waters and Water Courses 
405IV Natural Lakes and Ponds 
405kl 11 k. Rights to Bed and Banks. Most 
Cited Cases 
Owners of property on shores of lake should fail in 
their suit to quiet title to bed of lake as against state, 
if lake was navigable when state was admitted to 
union, but should prevail if lake was non-navigable at 
that time. Utah Code 1943, 86-1-14. 
121 Navigable Waters 270 €=>i(7) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kl(7) k. Evidence as to Navigability. 
Most Cited Cases 
Evidence that lake was comparatively small and so 
located that it was easier to go around than to cross it 
and that it would probably develop in future as 
irrigation reservoir, as it had in past, supported 
district court's finding of improbability that lake 
would ever be valuable as highway for commerce, as 
required to render it navigable and preclude owners 
of property on shores thereof from quieting title to 
lake bed as against state. Utah Code 1943, 86-1-14. 
]31 Navigable Waters 270 €=^l(3) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
To be "navigable," a water course should be 
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or 
possess capacity for valuable floatage in 
transportation to market of products of country 
through which it runs and should be of practical 
usefulness to public as public highway in its natural 
state, without aid of artificial means, and theoretical 
or potential navigability or temporary, precarious and 
unprofitable one is insufficient. 
141 Navigable Waters 270 €=>l(3) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
While navigable quality of water course need not be 
continuous, it should continue long enough to be 
useful and valuable in transportation, and fluctuations 
should come regularly with the seasons, so that 
period of navigability may be depended upon, to 
render it a navigable water course. 
151 Navigable Waters 270 €=^l(3) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kK3) k. Test of Navigability in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Mere depth of water, without profitable utility, or its 
sufficiency for pleasure boating or to enable hunters 
and fishermen to float their boats will not render 
water course navigable in legal sense, so as to subject 
it to public servitude, but to be navigable it must have 
useful capacity as public highway of transportation. 
J61 Navigable Waters 270 €^> i (3 ) 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
175P.2d759 
111 Utah 1, 175P.2d759 
(Cite as: 111 Utah 1,175 P.2d 759) 
Page 2 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
"Navigable water" is that which, by its depth, width 
and location, is rendered available for commerce, 
whether actually so used or not. 
121 Navigable Waters 270 €>^>l(3) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
270kl Navigability in General 
270kl(3) k. Test of Navigability in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
"Navigability" is not dependent merely on physical 
capabilities of particular body of water to support 
transportation of goods, but public interest therein 
arises only when it is so situated that it becomes or is 
likely to become a valuable factor in commerce. 
181 Navigable Waters 270 €=>i(7) 
270 Navigable Waters 
2701 Rights of Public 
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987: Robinson v. Thomas. 75 Utah 446. 286 
P. 625. 
**760 *3 Elias Hansen, of Salt Lake City, for 
appellants. 
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., C. N. Ottosen, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Milton A. Melville, of Fillmore, for 
respondents. 
PRATT, Justice. 
What is a navigable lake? This issue arises in a suit 
in which plaintiffs and defendants each seek to quiet 
title to the bed of Scipio Lake, in Millard County, this 
State. Plaintiffs own property on the shores of the 
lake and the defendant State of Utah has leased part 
of the bed of the lake to defendant George E. Brown, 
for grazing purposes. The grazing brought plaintiffs 
and Brown in conflict. 
[1] If the lake was navigable when this state was 
admitted to the Union plaintiffs should fail. Sec. 86-
1-14, U.C.A. 1943; Povnter v. Chipman. 8 Utah 442. 
32 P. 690: Knudsen v. Omanson. 10 Utah 124, 37 P. 
250: State v. Rolio. 71 Utah 91. 262 P. 987: 
Robinson v. Thomas et al.. 75 Utah 446. 286 P. 625: 
and annotation 23 A.L.R. 757. 
It the lake was non-navigable at that time plaintiffs 
should prevail. In addition to the above authorities: 
Annotation 112 A.L.R. 1114: State v. Aucoin. 206 
La. 787. 20 So.2d 136. at page 158: United States v. 
Appalachian Power Co.. 311 U.S. 377. 61 S.Ct. 291. 
85 L.Ed. 243: United States v. State of Oregon. 295 
U.S. 1. 55 S.Ct. 610. 79 L.Ed. 1267: United States v. 
State of Utah. 283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 438. 75 L.Ed. 
844: United States v. Holt Bank. 270 U.S. 49. 46 
S.Ct. 197. 70 L.Ed. 465: State of Oklahoma v. State 
of Texas. 258 U.S. 574. 42 S.Ct. 406. 66 L.Ed. 771: 
and Gratz v. McKee. 8 Cir.. 270 F. 713 23 A.L.R. 
1393. (The dissenting opinion in the Louisiana case 
and the annotations of 23 A.L.R. and 112 A.L.R. 
cover the authorities upon this question rather 
thoroughly. The Louisiana case was decided in 1944. 
Sec. 86-1-14, U.C.A.1943, by its terms excludes the 
beds of non-navigable lakes from the legislative 
declaration of ownership.) 
*4 The lower court found in favor of defendants and 
plaintiffs have appealed. 
Conveyances to plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
interest are by lot and section number so no claim can 
arise that plaintiffs* property rights are specifically 
limited by description to the meander line of the lake. 
Among the facts found by the lower court are these: 
At the time Utah was settled, Scipio Lake was a 
natural lake; a 2 foot dam was, about that time 
(1867), built at the lower end of the lake; that the lake 
had an extreme length of about 1 1/2 miles, and a 
maximum width of about 5/8 of a mile; that it had an 
average depth of 4 to 5 feet and covered an area when 
filled to capacity of the natural basin of 
approximately 580 acres (plaintiffs contend 277 
acres); that the Federal Government surveyed the 
lake in 1871, fixing its meander line, fixing the length 
of the lake at 1 3/4 miles and width of 3/4 mile; that it 
has maintained that size until the present time, except 
for dry years when irrigation lowered it considerably; 
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that the meander line fixed the approximate size of 
the lake when this State was admitted to statehood 
(Jan. 4, 1896); that it has not been used for 
transportation of 'goods of commerce'; that it has no 
connection with navigable streams or other navigable 
bodies of water; that it has been used for boating, 
fishing, and swimming; and that its surroundings are 
such it appears improbable the lake will ever be 
valuable as a highway for commerce. The court then 
makes this statement as a part of his findings of fact: 
'* * * that in view of the trend of decisions in recent 
years to view similar shallow bodies of water as 
**761 navigable, the Court finds that Scipio Lake at 
the time Utah was admitted to the Union was a 
navigable body of water * * *.' 
This is a conclusion of law supported by the court's 
explanation of why he believed it necessary. The 
conclusion of navigability is repeated as paragraph 
one of his conclusions of law. We are of the opinion 
that navigability should not be determined without 
regard to practical considerations.*5 The fact that 
the lower court included the explanation impresses 
one with the thought that he thought the lake was not, 
as a matter of fact, navigable, but, due to the 
idiosyncrasies of the law, it must be so held. 
[21 Scipio Lake is comparatively small and so 
located that, as stated by one witness, it is easier to go 
around it than to cross it. The public left to itself, is 
not going to select the hard way of travel, and if it is 
a short cut to go around it, that short cut will be used. 
These facts considered in the light of the probability 
of the future of that lake developing as it has in the 
past, as a reservoir for irrigation, are ample support 
for the court's finding that it is improbable the lake 
will ever be valuable as a highway for commerce. 
Such a finding is inconsistent with the idea that The 
natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a 
channel for useful commerce.' (Italics ours.) 
(Quoting Mr. Justice Hughes in United States v. State 
of Utah, supra f283 U.S. 64. 51 S.Ct. 445]). The 
author of the cited opinion also uses the expression 
'To meet the needs of commerce.' (Italics ours.) 
The factual differences between that case and this 
must not be lost to our sight. There the court was 
dealing with miles of river crossing state lines which 
might easily be broken up into navigable and non-
navigable areas. There was value in the use of such 
long stretches of water-they were useful-the public 
had need for them. But Scipio Lake is so small it 
must be treated as a unit. It, as a unit, is either 
valuable for transportation or it is not valuable. 
There is no evidence justifying any conclusion that it 
is likely ever to develop as a valuable means of 
public commercial transportation. Obviously its 
navigability should not be governed by our powers of 
imagination to vision what we deem sufficient to 
make it such a public waterway. 
f31[41[51 In Harrison v. Fite. 8 Cir.. 148 F. 781. 783. 
cited in the Louisiana case (dissenting opinion) of our 
list above, there is some discussion of the element of 
*6 usefulness. We quote therefrom: T o meet the 
test of navigability as understood in the American 
law a water course should be susceptible of use for 
purposes of commerce or possess a capacity for 
valuable floatage in the transportation to market of 
the products of the country through which it runs. It 
should be of practical usefulness to the public as a 
public highway in its natural state and without the aid 
of artificial means. A theoretical or potential 
navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious, and 
unprofitable, is not sufficient. While the navigable 
quality of a water course need not be continuous, yet 
it should continue long enough to be useful and 
valuable in transportation; and the fluctuations should 
come regularly with the seasons, so that the period of 
navigability may be depended upon. Mere depth of 
water, without profitable utility, will not render a 
water course navigable in the legal sense, so as to 
subject it to public servitude, nor will the fact that it 
is sufficient for pleasure boating or to enable hunters 
or fishermen to float their skiffs or canoes. To be 
navigable a water course must have a useful capacity 
as a public highway of transportation. * * *.' 
£61 In the Louisiana case [206 La. 787. 20 So.2d 
154]. the prevailing opinion states the law to be (as to 
navigable water): cIt is that which, by its depth, 
width, and location is rendered available for 
commerce whether it be actually so used or not.' 
(Italics ours.) We believe that location is an 
important factor in this western mountainous and 
desert country. The writer has in mind a lake above 
timber line and near the top of a 10,000 foot 
mountain peak which from the standpoint of depth 
and width would have floatage potentialities 
sufficient for the transportation of goods-but to 
where? That's the question. Furthermore it is almost 
a hands **762 and knees climb to get to that lake. To 
hold it to be a navigable body of water would be an 
oddity to say the least. Sailing that lake, one would 
get nowhere fast. 
In the case of Gratz v. McKee, supra, speaking of a 
stream, the court quoted the following language from 
a Washington case as the weight of authority: *7 'It 
must be so situated, and have such length and 
capacity, as will enable it to accommodate the public 
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generally as a means of transportation.' Page 716 of 
270 R. Page 1396 of 23 A.L.R. 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, the term 
'useful commerce' is used and these words were 
adopted in the case of United States v. State of Utah. 
[7] It seems fair to say from all of these decisions 
that navigability is not dependent merely upon the 
physical capabilities of the particular body of water 
to support transportation of goods. The public interest 
in such a body of water arises only when it is so 
situated that it becomes or is likely to become a 
valuable factor in commerce. 
[8] In addition to the facts found by the lower court, 
there is evidence in the record that the only clear part 
of the lake in the early days was its center, that 
bullrushes and cattails covered part of it; and that part 
was sod used for haying, which was so soft in places 
that an ox sunk through it. There is also evidence of 
a growth upon its bed that cattle would wade out to 
eat. In some of the survey reports the term 'swamp' 
is used as to part of it. In the winter it froze over. 
Since statehood and since the dam has been increased 
considerably in height, there have been years when 
the lake went dry, presumably from irrigation use and 
dry weather. All these facts point away from the idea 
of navigability. If we hold the principle set out in the 
case of United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 
supra [311 U.S. 377. 61 S.Ct. 299], as applicable here 
there is still the factor of value or usefulness 
involved. The principle of that case, to which 
reference is made, is this: CA waterway, otherwise 
suitable for navigation, is not barred from that 
classification merely because artificial aids must 
make the highway suitable for use before commercial 
navigation may be undertaken.' But the court also 
says: 'There must be a balance between cost and 
need at a time when the improvement would be 
useful,'' (Italics ours.) *8 This is also said: 'The 
tests as to navigability must take these variations into 
consideration.' The words 'these variations' refer to a 
comparison made between the heavy traffic of the 
harbors of our seacoast and the traffic of the sparsely 
settled regions of the western mountains. 
For the reasons given we are of the opinion that 
Scipio Lake was not navigable at the time this State 
was admitted to the Union. We believe the evidence 
justifies a finding of the facts as we have set them out 
in this opinion, and that the conclusions and decree 
should be in favor of plaintiffs. The decree of the 
lower court is reversed and the cause remanded for 
findings, conclusions and decree to conform to this 
opinion. Costs to appellants. 
LARSON, C. J., and McDONOUGH, and WADE, 
JJ., concur. 
WOLFE, J., concurs in the result. 
Utah 1946 
Monroe v. State 
111 Utah 1,175P.2d759 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
